| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
065037
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
154928
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper aims to show trading patterns of certain items highly likely to be used
to develop nuclear and missile programs in North Korea. It analyzed North Korea’s
trade of nuclear―and missile―related items for ten years from 2006 to 2015 to
identify items in large volume as well as in increased demand and key suppliers
that contribute to sanctions―busting. This paper found that UN sanctions against
North Korea were not effective in controlling the flow of strategic items to North
Korea. Rather, a small number of states are responsible for a large share of trade
with North Korea that has continued to seek alternative suppliers. It also found
that China is a single supplier for multiple items and plays a major role along with
several others that either specialize in exports of specific items or gradually expand
the scope of supplies. Because the presence of a third country that provides North
Korea’s resilience and diversion of sanctions is crucial, this paper recommends
policy suggestions to enhance effectiveness of the existing sanctions regime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
172383
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
160347
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Recently, the international audience is interested in finding cases of denuclearization
in the past to draw out lessons that can be applied to North Korea. In order to
find the optimal reference point, it is crucial to carefully examine the background
of North Korea’s decision to begin denuclearization talks. Thus, this paper will
begin by discussing the overall context of the talks and highlight core issues that
may occur during the process of denuclearization. Next, it will examine which
case is most relevant to the negotiations with North Korea, and will analyze key
implications of Iran’s nuclear deal, which is the most recent and similar to the case
of North Korea. And by focusing on the core issues identified, it will suggest policy
considerations for preparing strategies to continue negotiations with North Korea.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
170574
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The US and allied goal should be to deter the use of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities rather than to destroy them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
188800
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Three decades of efforts to secure North Korea’s denuclearisation failed to arrest Pyongyang’s development of a nuclear arsenal. With growing dangers of conflict escalation and nuclear use, it is time to consider alternative policies that address the reality of North Korea as a nuclear possessor state. Comprehensive arms control is worth exploring as one potential approach to managing nuclear dangers on the Korean Peninsula. Previously, conventional arms-control and denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea proceeded in parallel. However, the increasing complexity of deterrence resulting from changes in military capabilities, especially in South Korea, now necessitates a comprehensive process that creates linkages across conventional and strategic domains to address not just North Korean and South Korean, but also US, capabilities. Though comprehensive arms control promises to be politically fraught and technically complex, policymakers and experts should debate whether it could yield a more secure Korean Peninsula than existing policies that have long since failed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
187963
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s actions in Ukraine since February 2022 have sent shockwaves globally. Attention has understandably focused on the change in European attitudes toward security threats posed by Moscow, with the United States leading coalition-building responses including naming and shaming, imposing sanctions, and supplying military assistance to Ukraine. The demonstrative effect of the strength, unity and speed of the Western response must ring alarm bells for Beijing, but it also leads to interesting questions about each state’s choice of alignment globally. In Europe, most states have chosen shared common security interests with one side of a great-power rivalry (in this case, with the US over Russia and China).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|