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| 1 |
ID:
083110
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It remains to be seen whether the rule of law and robust institutions can be built in Kosovo. The answer will show whether a common EU (and transatlantic) foreign policy is possible in the diffuse post-Cold War world
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| 2 |
ID:
114967
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
If any nation seemed destined to succeed at painful post-war transitional justice, it was Serbia after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. The country's seven million Serbs, even if they did not enjoy rule of law as they emerged from the brutal Balkan wars of the 1990s, did have established courts and other institutions that could be made to serve the interests of justice. They had a rambunctious civil society that deposed Milosevic (with the help of a mobilising election and the defection of some of his thugs) in 2000. In Zoran Djindjic they had a crusading prime minister who defied public opinion to extradite Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague in 2001. They had prosecutors willing to indict far more of their own ethnic group for war crimes committed in the 1990s Balkan wars than were neighbouring Croat, Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Kosovar prosecutors. And the Serbs had the European Union next door to nurture and nudge their country toward democratic best practices on its way to eventual EU membership.
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| 3 |
ID:
065207
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| 4 |
ID:
122002
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Back in the 1990s, Ivica Dacic, known as 'Little Slobo', was the spokesman who justified strongman Slobodan Milosevic's conquests of neighbouring non-Serbs in the Balkan wars. Aleksandar Vucic, as the information minister of Yugoslav President Milosevic, was the hatchet man for the media who defended the vast ethnic cleansing by paramilitary police of more than 60% of the 90%-majority Albanians living in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Tomislav Nikolic was the deputy leader of the Serbian Radical Party that berated Milosevic for being too soft and not seizing much more contiguous territory for a Greater Serbia; the party's founder, Vojislav Seselj, would shortly report to The Hague for trial on war-crimes charges.
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| 5 |
ID:
101257
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| 6 |
ID:
130833
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| 7 |
ID:
156305
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Russia, Ukraine and the West may finally be groping for a way to dial down the violence in Ukraine’s eastern tip that has claimed more than 10,000 Ukrainian lives and generated some 1.5 million displaced persons in the past 46 months.1 If it succeeds, the modus vivendi will be messy, brought about by a convergence of Russian failure to reclaim Catherine the Great’s ‘Novorossiya’ from Ukraine, Moscow’s budget squeeze from economic stagnation and Western sanctions, the implausibility of any Ukrainian military reconquest of insurgent-held territory in the east and the restabilisation of the old Ukrainian oligarchy.
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| 8 |
ID:
146353
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In holding Russia’s military behemoth to a stalemate in President Vladimir Putin’s undeclared war on Ukraine, Kiev has won an improbable victory. After a year of intensive shelling during a poorly observed truce in the Donbas, the big guns went silent there on 1 September 2015 and have stayed silent ever since.
Yet as the immediate existential threat recedes, the oligarchs who once personally financed the country’s defence seem to be trying to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. They have forgotten their original shock at Moscow’s lightning annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and are reverting to their cozy personal exploitation of Ukraine’s patrimony. This is precisely the kind of dysfunction that Putin is now counting on to make Kiev implode, even as he eases outside pressure by accepting military deadlock in eastern Ukraine.
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