|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
047653
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New York, Routledge, 1999.
|
| Description |
viii, 285p.
|
| Standard Number |
0415922372
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043622 | 327.17470947/BER 043622 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
175078
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since September 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs. In fact, numerous countries in the past have expressed interest in radiological weapons; a number have actively pursued them; and three tested them on multiple occasions before ultimately deciding not to deploy the weapons. Why is so little known about these false starts, especially outside the United States? Are such weapons more difficult to manufacture than depicted by science-fiction authors and military pundits? Are radiological weapons a thing of the past, or do they remain an attractive option for some countries? A comparative analysis of the previously underexplored cases of radiological weapons programs in the United States and the Soviet Union illuminates the drivers and limitations of weapons innovation in one specific nuclear sector. An examination of the rise and demise of radiological weapons programs in both countries also points to circumstances in the future that might prompt renewed interest on the part of some states in radiological weapons and proposes steps that might be undertaken to reduce the possibility of their production, deployment, and use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
153370
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The inclusion of a little-noticed phrase in the final document agreed by a review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2010 can be seen, in retrospect, to have laid the foundation for what, some seven years later, has become a surprisingly successful effort to achieve a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons – or, as it is commonly known, a nuclear ban treaty. At the time of writing, a ban treaty was being negotiated at the United Nations, and was likely to be concluded in early July 2017. The ban treaty is, at least in some respects, an outgrowth of what can be termed the ‘humanitarian-impact movement’ (HIM). This movement, pursued by both states and civil-society groups, has sought to refocus attention on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and especially the potential impacts of their use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
065092
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2005.
|
| Description |
ix, 376p.
|
| Standard Number |
0415952433
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050012 | 363.32/FER 050012 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
102290
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2010.
|
| Description |
xi, 188p.
|
| Standard Number |
9780415494847, hbk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055785 | 363.32/POT 055785 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
002408
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
California, Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, 1988.
|
| Description |
22; 8p.
|
| Series |
CISA working paper; 62
|
| Standard Number |
0866820795
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 029208 | 327.1740973/POT 029208 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
082428
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Many countries received Soviet-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian nuclear research purposes. Because of inadequate nuclear security at a number of the research sites, U.S. policy has sought to remove or otherwise safely dispose of their HEU stocks as quickly as possible. Although the pace of HEU disposition has accelerated significantly in recent years, several sites have posed formidable technical, economic, and political challenges. This article identifies the major obstacles to HEU removal at two key installations-Kharkiv in Ukraine, and Sosny in Belarus-and recommends a strategy for overcoming these impediments. Key components for a successful disposition strategy include: treating these cases with the urgency they deserve, expanding potential compensation packages, explicitly addressing the institutional and political issues involved, engaging high-level political leaders, working with third parties, and promoting these efforts as part of a nondiscriminatory initiative to phase out HEU in the civilian nuclear sector globally.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
068712
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
061633
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Lexington, Lexington Books, 1990.
|
| Description |
ix, 431p.
|
| Standard Number |
0669211206
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 033228 | 355.825119/POT 033228 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
107374
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most sought-after prizes in international disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy is a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In such a conflict-ridden area with a history of mistrust and animosity where chemical weapons were used in the past, the prospect of renewed WMD use is all too possible.[1] For these reasons, a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is not only an aspirational goal, but a matter of practical urgency.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
094528
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
042098
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Massachusetts, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1982.
|
| Description |
xvii, 279p.
|
| Standard Number |
0899461638
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022053 | 327.174/POT 022053 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
005279
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Monterey, Institute of International Studies, 1993.
|
| Description |
v, 204p.
|
| Series |
Monetary Institute of International Studies Monograph; no.1
|
| Standard Number |
096338595X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036458 | 355.8251190947/POT 036458 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
082424
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
037440
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984.
|
| Description |
xiv, 319p.
|
| Standard Number |
0043510639
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 025495 | 355.033547/POT 025495 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
054406
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Geneva, UNIDIR, 2000.
|
| Description |
viii, 84p.
|
| Standard Number |
929045136X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044207 | 355.825119/POT 044207 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
054531
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Geneva, UNIDIR, 2000.
|
| Description |
viii, 84p.
|
| Series |
UNIDIR/2000/20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044299 | 355.825119/POT 044299 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
143029
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The ninth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in New York on 27 April–22 May 2015 under the presidency of Ambassador Taous Feroukhi of Algeria. Like its predecessors in 1980, 1990 and 2005, it failed to reach a consensus final document.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|