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| 1 |
ID:
152055
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| Summary/Abstract |
Modern methods of nuclear-explosion monitoring are vastly more capable than they were when underground nuclear testing began in the late 1950s, in part because a cycle of improvements in explosion monitoring in the 1960–80 period led to improvements in monitoring for earthquakes and other phenomena, which then led to a general growth in monitoring assets that in turn has been applied back to explosion monitoring. Practical experiences in nuclear-explosion monitoring, acquired during the era of active testing prior to finalization of the CTBT text in 1996, laid the basis for monitoring in support of this arms-control initiative. This article elaborates on the future of nuclear-test-monitoring technology, which can build upon an additional and remarkable growth of general monitoring assets that began in the 1990s, largely unrelated to the specifics of nuclear-test monitoring. A new cycle of improvements in earthquake monitoring is likely to improve monitoring for explosions. While it is not easy to quantify the degree of monitoring improvement afforded by such new assets, an example from North Korea indicates the improvement can be substantial.
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| 2 |
ID:
065325
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| Publication |
Jan-Aug 2005.
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| 3 |
ID:
115974
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We have attempted to detect seismic signals from small explosions in North Korea on five specific days in 2010 that feature in scenarios proposed by De Geer. We searched the seismic data recorded by station MDJ in northeastern China, applying three-component cross-correlation methods using signals from known explosions as templates. We assess the capability of this method of detection, and of simpler methods, all of which failed to find seismic signals that would be expected if De Geer's scenarios were valid. We conclude that no well-coupled underground explosion above about a ton occurred near the North Korea test site on these five days and that any explosion would have to be very small (local magnitude less than about 2) to escape detection.
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