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| 1 |
ID:
133960
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates how a collective memory of trauma was produced in the course of commemorating the 2-28 Incident in the context of the 2004 election campaign, and how this memory production led to the parallel formation of a Taiwanese national identity. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally was designed to remember the 2-28 Incident as a historical trauma in order to be forgotten. The remembering of the 2-28 Incident must be regarded as a constructive process as opposed to a retrieval process. The memory of the 2-28 Incident was selectively constituted in favor of sovereign power.
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| 2 |
ID:
090220
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On September 8, 2008, the Trial-heat Forecasting Model predicted that in-party candidate Senator John McCain would receive 52.7% of the national two-party popular presidential vote. The forecast of a victory of modest proportions for Senator McCain reflected his having a five-percentage-point lead over Senator Barack Obama in Gallup's early September, post-convention poll (49% to 44%) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis' August report of a 3.3% GDP growth rate in the second quarter of the year, about average for a second quarter election year economy.
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| 3 |
ID:
132343
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In spite of all the difficulties, the November 2013 elections in Nepal passed off for the most part peacefully and with fewer irregularities than ever before in Nepal. The electoral system was the same as the system used in 2008, with a combination of First Past the Post and Proportional Representation. The results were a defeat for the Maoists, who went from being the biggest single party to the third biggest party. The victors were the two older established parties, the Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxist-Leninists, who seem to have benefitted from the voters dissatisfaction with the Maoists' showing in government. The second big losers in the election were the parties who favoured an ethnic-based solution to Nepal's problems, though the relationship between the Madheshis and the centre remains an unsolved problem.
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| 4 |
ID:
179337
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In the 2020 general election, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 920 of the total 1,117 seats, which was upped by 61 seats from its win in the 2015 election. The main opposition party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won 71 seats, down 46 from the 2015 election when it won 117 seats. The election result gave a strong mandate to the NLD for another five years. On the other hand, the USDP accused the NLD of engaging in electoral fraud including the buying of votes, and called for fresh elections in coordination with the military. Following a complaint from its proxy party, the USDP, the military initially said it would conduct an investigation in 218 townships where the military personnel and their family members cast their votes, which it expanded to 314 townships in all states and regions across the country; this finally led to the declaration of a state of emergency rule (the military coup) on 1 February 2021. Ethnic parties also alleged that the NLD government made certain pre-poll decisions that disadvantaged the ethnic minorities. This paper analyzes the electoral process and its outcome in an attempt to understand whether the election led to the deepening of democracy or the widening of division in the country's democratization process.
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| 5 |
ID:
067599
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| 6 |
ID:
129510
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| 7 |
ID:
101066
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ten days after announcing its candidature, and amidst some surprise, Canada was elected to a non-permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. This article will show how and why this came about. In so doing, it will demonstrate that Canada's election was an important episode from several perspectives. First, it was a milestone in Canada's gradual international coming of age, confirming that it was entitled to all the rights and responsibilities of League membership. Second, it was a significant step in the development of the Commonwealth into an association of equals. And, third, it contributed to the gelling of the emerging group system in elections to the League Council.
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| 8 |
ID:
098217
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| 9 |
ID:
174440
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| 10 |
ID:
126540
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reports on an audience costs experiment embedded into a survey of the British public (N = 2235). We extend previous research into audience costs in three main directions. First, we provide clear and direct evidence that they exist for a second-order democratic power, the United Kingdom. Second, we show that the extent of audience costs varies, and at times substantially, along with features of the crisis situation that have not been examined empirically in this context before. In particular, the type of crisis strongly influences public reactions both to bluffing in general and to the wisdom or otherwise of escalating crises before backing down. While audience costs do appear to exist for a UK Prime Minister, he or she cannot inflate them by moving up the escalation chain. Rather, a limited use of force tends to mitigate these costs among the British public because it appears to them a more consistent strategy. Third, we show that public disapproval of a failed bluffing strategy is stronger among the more politically engaged, increasing the likelihood that audience costs will be paid at the ballot box.
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| 11 |
ID:
130443
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2014.
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How do authoritarian elections affect voters' attitudes toward the regime and their support for democracy? This article draws upon the case of village elections in China to argue that elections may have two simultaneous effects. First, free and fair elections increase citizens' confidence in the government. Second, elections also allow voters to exercise political rights and accumulate democratic experience through participation, and this in turn may trigger greater demand for further empowerment. Empirical analysis of data from a two-round nationwide survey conducted in 114 villages confirms both effects. One implication of these findings is that competitive elections may simultaneously boost regime popularity and increase public demand for further democratic reform.
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| 12 |
ID:
119553
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| 13 |
ID:
145901
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Bloomsbury Publishing India Pvt. Ltd., 2015.
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| Description |
192p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789385436956
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058710 | 967.5/SUN 058710 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
097631
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do two cognate literatures-social movements and electoral studies-travel along parallel paths with little conversation between them? And what can be done to connect them in the future? Drawing on their work with the late Charles Tilly on Dynamics of Contention (2001), Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow examine two important studies that approach (but do not effect such a linkage), propose a mechanism-based set of linkages between elections and social movements, and apply their approach in a preliminary examination of the relations between the American anti-war movement after 9/11 and the Democratic Party.
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| 15 |
ID:
103559
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| 16 |
ID:
119586
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| 17 |
ID:
133167
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The battle for control of the U.S. House of Representatives was over before it even started, but the fight for control of the U.S. Senate is proving to be a knock-down, drag-out affair that could easily go either way.
Control of the U.S. House is pretty much a settled affair. Republicans occupy 93 percent of the congressional districts that GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney carried in 2012, and Democrats hold 96 percent of the districts that Obama won. As a result, there are very few "fish out of water," or Republicans sitting in Democratic-leaning districts or Democrats in GOP-tilting districts. Yes, there are a large number of open House seats this cycle, but most are in districts which safely belong to one side or the other. It would seem that the next realistic shot Democrats have at winning control of the House would come in 2022, after the next round of redistricting takes place in 2021. The 2018 and 2020 gubernatorial and state legislative elections will determine which party in each state has the dominant hand in the redistricting process. Republicans had it in most states in 2011, and Democrats want it badly in 2021.
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| 20 |
ID:
086458
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The evolution of a multiparty system in Taiwan has seen public opinion about the independence/unification issue coinciding with partisan positions. While aggregate public opinion data have shown that most Taiwanese support the current cross-Strait relations, or "status quo," less is known about the stability of individual policy preferences. Drawing on panel data from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) project, this article examines whether the same respondents maintained the same position on the constitutional question in 2001 and 2004. Using ordered probit modeling, it also assesses the impact of previously-held opinions and rational assessments on attitudes in 2004, net of standard sociological and psychological determinants. We find that nearly half of respondents changed their preferences between 2001 and 2004. When opinions did change, there was a trend toward support for the status quo from a pro-unification position. In addition to showing the lag impact of a previous attitude, our analysis confirms that self-identified nationality, partisanship, and rational assessments of Taiwan's economy are significant predictors of positions on the independence/unification issue.
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