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| 1 |
ID:
168650
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2011, a government initiative provided Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stoves and cylinders to almost 1000 rural families in Chiapas, Mexico. In 2017, the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) conducted an evaluation of cooking practices among the beneficiaries of these stoves.
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| 2 |
ID:
093834
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| 3 |
ID:
125136
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this essay I discuss how and why U.S. policies intended to stop Latin American immigration to the United States not only failed, but proved counterproductive by ultimately accelerating the rate of both documented and undocumented migration from Mexico and Central America to the United States. As a result, the Latino population grew much faster than demographers had originally projected and the undocumented population grew to an unprecedented size. Mass illegality is now the greatest barrier to the successful integration of Latinos, and a pathway to legalization represents a critical policy challenge. If U.S. policy-makers wish to avoid the failures of the past, they must shift from a goal of immigration suppression to one of immigration management within an increasingly integrated North American market.
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| 4 |
ID:
185630
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has promoted himself as a historical figure equal to the great heroes of Mexico’s national mythology. His populist rhetoric denigrates political opponents as enemies of the people. But more than two years into his term, his promises of economic growth have failed to materialize, partly because of his attachment to austerity.
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| 5 |
ID:
190840
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| Summary/Abstract |
How does exposure to criminal violence shape attitudes towards justice and the rule of law? Citizens care about crime prevention and procedural legality, yet they also value punishing perpetrators for the harm they have done. We argue that anger induced by exposure to criminal violence increases the demand for retribution and harsh punishments, even at the expense of the rule of law. We test this theory using one observational and two experimental studies from an original survey of 1,200 individuals in Western Mexico, a region affected by organized criminal violence and vigilantism. First, we first show that exposure to violence is correlated with increased anger and support for punitive justice, including vigilante actions. Second, across our two experiments, we show that citizens are more supportive of harsh punishments and place less value on their legality in response to morally outrageous crimes. Third, we find that the innocence of the victim, rather than the severity of the crime, is what triggers outrage and punitiveness. This suggests that citizens may support extreme levels of violence as long as they perceive that its targets are criminals. Finally, we show that outrageous forms of violence against civilians can lead individuals to prioritize harsh punishment regardless of its legality. When criminal actors target perceived innocents with common crimes like extortion, there is greater support for harsh, vigilante action. These patterns provide a bottom-up explanation for harsh justice.
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| 6 |
ID:
112503
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mexico's economic relationship with China has intensified substantially in the last decade. Based on an increasing literature on the overall and aggregate relationship, this analysis proposes a detailed examination of the auto parts-automobile chain, which is of utmost importance for both countries and will be significant for understanding the future trade relationship between them. In order to understand the industrial organization of Mexico and China, the article first gives an overview of the international trade and industrial organization patterns. After establishing the characteristics of Mexico's and China's legal framework, production, employment and trade, the analysis concludes with a group of proposals to improve binational co-operation. Both countries - China interested in increasing its export platform based on Chinese parts brands and Mexico supplying parts and components and providing decades of experiences in international networks - can benefit from these suggestions and overcome current tensions.
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| 7 |
ID:
171939
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| Summary/Abstract |
International monetary organisations argue the ‘developing countries’ should foster linkages to the world economy as a means to overcome backwardness. In this article we refute the narrative that Mexico has experienced industrial upgrading. Rather, industrial growth in Mexico over the last 40 years has been shaped by neoliberal economic policies which have turned the Mexican economy into an export-led manufacturing platform designed to supply the North American market, sustained by a precarious labour market. As a result, Mexico occupies the most labour-intensive and low value-added segments of regional production chains. To make this argument, we perform an in-depth analysis of the Mexican automotive industry, demonstrating that instead of being an engine for domestic industrial development, the auto industry has become a dominant economic sector through productive hyper-specialisation concentrated in the northern Mexican border states, a reliance on transnational capital, particularly from the United States, a disconnect with domestic markets, and the super-exploitation of labour.
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| 8 |
ID:
100277
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study revisits the debate on trade reform in Latin America, focusing specifically on what combinations of conditions were necessary and sufficient for very rapid trade liberalization. It departs significantly from two types of studies that have been previously used to examine Latin American trade reform: (1) those using large samples and linear statistics to test the mean effects of variables on levels of trade protection and (2) those isolating necessary conditions for rapid reform but using a small number of case studies. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and short case studies, the study considers trade policy in sixty-one administrations. It finds that a key motivating factor for rapid trade opening is potential resistance from protected industry; it further identifies several other important enabling conditions, such as hyperinflation, devaluation, and an unconstrained executive. In combination, these enabling conditions are sufficient to account for a high percentage of rapid reform episodes.
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| 9 |
ID:
086154
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Seven years ago, in his State of the Union address on Jan. 29, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush warned of an "axis of evil" that was engaged in assisting terrorists, acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and "arming to threaten the peace of the world." In Bush's telling, this exclusive new club had three members: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Bush's policy prescription for dealing with the axis of evil was preemption, and just over a year later he put this doctrine into action by invading Iraq.
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| 10 |
ID:
132973
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a new explanation of the widespread occurrence of cycles of protest in electoral autocracies - the most common type of authoritarian regime in the world today. Because multiparty elections in autocracies are partially free but unfair, opposition parties are compelled to compete for office while contesting the rules of competition. To fulfill this dual goal, opposition parties actively seek to recruit a wide variety of independent social movements who can provide votes and lead major mobilizations during election campaigns and in post-election rallies to denounce fraud. Because electoral participation can cause divisions within social movements, social activists join socio-electoral coalitions when opposition parties offer them financial and logistic resources and institutional protection to mobilize for their causes during non-election times. This quid pro quo explains how isolated protest events become aggregated into powerful cycles of mobilization and why protest is more intense during elections but persists beyond election cycles. When political liberalization leads to increasingly free and fair elections, the prospect of victory motivates opposition parties to discourage radical mobilization, bringing cycles of protest to an end. Drawing on an original database of indigenous protest in Mexico and on case studies, I provide quantitative and qualitative evidence of the causal impact of electoral incentives on the rise, development and decline of a powerful cycle of indigenous protest as Mexico transitioned from one-party to multi-party autocracy and into democracy. Beyond Mexico, I show that the introduction of multiparty elections in a wide variety of autocracies around the world gave rise to major cycles of protest and discuss why the relationship between the ballot and the street is a crucial factor for understanding the dynamics of stability and change of authoritarian regimes.
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| 11 |
ID:
073058
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| 12 |
ID:
090195
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The only problem with the invasion is that it never happened. The U.S.-Mexico border is not now and has never been out of control. From 1950 to the present, the total number of migrants entering the United States from Mexico has varied very little. There has certainly been no massive upsurge. What changed were the auspices under which Mexicans entered the country, their place of entry, their ultimate U.S. destination and their tendency to remain here rather than return home. Workers previously labeled immigrants became illegals. The border was fortified. States with high immigrant populations cracked down. Walls were built. Immigration turned into a militarized policy issue. And since it became increasingly risky for Mexicans to cross the border, once here, they remained. All these changes are a consequence of our own misguided immigration and border policies.
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| 13 |
ID:
106785
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Academic commentary has long emphasised the asymmetry in Mexico-China relations. In particular, much attention has focussed since the early 1990s particularly from the Mexican side on the economic imbalance in trade and investment that has become and remains acute with the expansion of the economy of the People's Republic of China. This is though far from the only sense in which the relationship between the two countries is asymmetrical. There is also a severe imbalance in the relative importance of politics and economics as determinants of this relationship for both China and Mexico. The Mexican Government seems to be more concerned with its economic relationship with China. In contrast, the PRC Government seems more concerned with its political relationship with Mexico. Moreover, there is a further asymmetry in the respective significance that each appears to have to the other as a partner. Mexico plays a small role in China's outlook but China looms large in Mexico's worldview. Identification of a number of cross-cutting asymmetrical relationships suggests that a bilateral perspective may not be the most effective for understanding the interaction or potential interaction between Mexico and China. On the contrary, there is more logic to the elements of cooperation and conflict between Mexico and China when their relationship is viewed in the wider, multilateral context of globalisation.
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| 14 |
ID:
100458
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| 15 |
ID:
129519
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| 16 |
ID:
118375
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Latin American countries have historically followed different paths and logics toward the nonproliferation regime. Some states have unconditionally advocated for global and nonproliferation efforts, while others have vehemently opposed such measures or remained ambivalent toward the regime itself. By historically comparing two of Latin America's most influential countries-Brazil and Mexico-this study identifies the underlying domestic conditions and external influences that explain their differences in behavior and policy toward the nonproliferation regime. Because little is known about the reasons why different Latin American countries adopt these different approaches, the purpose of this article is to resolve this problem, primarily by focusing on the ways in which evolving civil-military relations and US influence have shaped nonproliferation policy preferences in Latin America. It concludes with a discussion of how these historical cases might shed light on current nonproliferation policies in Latin America.
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| 17 |
ID:
108345
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Mexican drug war, in full swing since December 2006, has now claimed more than 40,000 lives. Dozens of high-level cartel operatives have been captured or killed, yet the leadership of one cartel, from Sinaloa in northwestern Mexico, has remained apparently untouched. The apparent lack of a crackdown on the Sinaloa Cartel has spurred criticisms of the Calderón administration, as well as US authorities aiding in the drug fight - some critics contend that the Sinaloa Cartel has enjoyed protection from the authorities. The Sinaloa Cartel's history of protection and collusion by authorities goes back a long way - during the reign of the PRI from 1929 to 2000, Sinaloa's drug traffickers were allowed to operate with near-total impunity. But mounting evidence - captures and deaths of high-level operatives from Sinaloa as well as arrests of relatives of the leadership - suggests that the claims of collusion against the current Mexican administration are false.
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| 18 |
ID:
097169
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| 19 |
ID:
121554
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In December 2006, Felipe Calderón took over as Mexico's new president and made a bold decision to directly confront the drug trafficking organizations that had steadily gained power over the course of his predecessors' terms in office. He started by sending troops into his home state of Michoacán, and over the next six years Mexico's government succeeded in pushing drug-ferrying planes off its airstrips and into airfields in Guatemala and Honduras. Over the course of "Calderón's War" Mexican soldiers captured and killed dozens of high profile cartel leaders. But after more than half a decade of continuous anti-cartel operations, many of the traditional strongholds of the country's drug trafficking organizations have experienced a worrisome deterioration in security. For instance, in the state of Guerrero, as cartel leaders such as the Beltran Leyva brothers and La Barbie were taken down, a destabilizing sequence of inter-cartel competition has led to a string of disturbing violent incidents as well as complaints about robbery and extortion. Over the course of Calderón's presidency it became clear that without complementary improvements in local policing efforts, the anti-cartel strategy would not be able to bring Mexico the long-term security and stability that citizens demand. Fighting the drug cartels is not enough. Effective security policy requires the police to help protect ordinary citizens from "unorganized" crimes such as theft, carjacking, and extortion.
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| 20 |
ID:
162383
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