Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
009219
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Publication |
May 1995.
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Description |
19-21
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2 |
ID:
010052
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Publication |
1995.
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Description |
15-29
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3 |
ID:
010050
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Publication |
1995.
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Description |
1-14
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4 |
ID:
008857
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Publication |
1995.
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Description |
1-53
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5 |
ID:
079898
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Publication |
2007.
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Summary/Abstract |
The British government decision on `Trident renewal' forms part of a much wider rebuff to the non-proliferation and peace agenda. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty risks being discredited at its next review in 2010; new nuclear powers are setting the pace for others; another `war' is being threatened which will last `for generations'. There has been no post-Cold War peace dividend, and the chance to make up for lost time has been missed. War, not peace, is once again seen as the universal default mode.
It is now clear that traditional arguments in favour of peace and nuclear disarmament are never going to succeed. The view that one `cannot predict the unpredictable', used to justify the Trident decision, will always result in decisions being reached on a worst-case scenario. New arguments need to be developed with a broader appeal based not only on strategic calculation but on a compelling alternative world view.
Looking both forward and back into history we have to rediscover peace, not war, as humanity's central concern. Just as the test of the good ruler in ancient China was to maintain peace within the four corners of the kingdom, so today modern states have a shared obligation to exercise good governance across the globe. The effort to reshape our common goals will require a sustained exercise in the re-education of elites, and the mobilisation of multitudes
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6 |
ID:
018099
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Publication |
Fall-Winter 2000.
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Description |
1-9
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7 |
ID:
094154
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8 |
ID:
087545
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Following its election in 2007, the Labour government imposed a moratorium on export of Australian uranium to India. This article argues that with the Indo-US deal and concomitant agreements now in place, Australia should agree to export uranium to India. It does so on the grounds that the agreements will adequately protect Australian uranium from misuse, will not unduly test the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, could open out opportunities to meet important safety concerns, could help stabilise potentially dangerous vertical and horizontal proliferation and could also mitigate the region's burgeoning production of greenhouse gases. In supporting the agreements through nuclear trade with India, however, Australia should use any influence it is able to garner thereby to ensure that the Indo-US agreement itself is not seen as part of an attempt on the part of the United States (US), or any other power, to harness India as a means of containing China, and thus exacerbating what could become a destabilising tendency in the region.
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9 |
ID:
111941
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
ULY 18 marks the 20th anniversary of the Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy.
Through this agreement, Argentina and Brazil jointly renounced the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons, affirmed their unequivocal commitment to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to monitor the commitments made.
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10 |
ID:
066159
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11 |
ID:
009215
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Publication |
May 1995.
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Description |
22-24
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12 |
ID:
008858
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Publication |
1995.
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Description |
1-7
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13 |
ID:
064359
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14 |
ID:
009216
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Publication |
Spring-Summer 1995.
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Description |
1-24
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15 |
ID:
179827
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Summary/Abstract |
Without the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear-armed states and their allies could no longer rely on their skewed interpretation of it to legitimise continued possession of nuclear weapons.
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16 |
ID:
008606
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Publication |
March 1995.
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Description |
33-36
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17 |
ID:
139030
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Summary/Abstract |
‘If only Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons, this would never have happened.’ The counterfactual heard around the world after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014 makes intuitive sense. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine became the world’s third-largest nuclear power (behind Russia and the United States), with approximately 1,900 strategic and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons.
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18 |
ID:
009214
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Publication |
July 1995.
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Description |
901-954
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19 |
ID:
064372
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20 |
ID:
065107
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