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| 1 |
ID:
087243
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| Publication |
London, Indiana University Press, 1973.
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| Description |
xii, 371p.
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| Standard Number |
0253305748
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 012508 | 337/CAL 012508 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
015150
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| Publication |
1989.
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| Description |
19-28
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| 3 |
ID:
077754
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The war in Iraq led to a confrontation between emerging American and European models for global governance. In imagining the future, each has tended to project its own positive experience in the Cold War years. Europeans imagine a multilateral concert, with confederal institutions encouraging mutual appeasement. Americans imagine a benevolent unipolar hegemony. Experience in the 1990s reinforced America's unipolar perspectives. Trends in the new century make Europe's model seem better adapted to an increasingly plural world system. The conclusion speculates on the European model's relevance to Asia. Much will depend on whether China and Japan can replicate the Franco-German reconciliation. China may have more success "containing" the US within a larger Eurasian or even UN context, including, in some fashion, Europe and the US. Conceivably the Western powers may more easily balance their own relations in a Eurasian rather than transatlantic geopolitical framework.
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| 4 |
ID:
031487
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| Publication |
Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books., 1987.
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| Description |
xi,288p.
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| Standard Number |
0745004814
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 030372 | 327.116091821/CAL 030372 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
053641
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| Publication |
2004.
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| Description |
p29-38
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| Summary/Abstract |
Deep political fissures have opened in the West. Contending visions of the future have arisen on each side of the Atlantic. America, driven by its outsize military and economic strength, has developed a unipolar, hegemonic vision of the future. Europe pursues its own self-sustaining union of nation states that points towards a pluralist world order that is multipolar, balanced and multilateral. The future of the West, and perhaps of the world, will depend on whether these two visions can accommodate each other sufficiently to establish a harmonious balance. However, without a more coherent and integrated Europe and a revival of American appreciation for constitutional balance, America's imperial fantasies and Europe's constitutional dreams may well defeat each other.
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| 6 |
ID:
118284
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Germany's postwar leaders played a critical role in creating the European Union. Their successors need to remember that federalism benefits the strong as well as the weak.
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| 7 |
ID:
083753
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| 8 |
ID:
091451
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Should Americans be worried that the international system is growing decidedly more plural and less hegemonic? Can a more plural world system be avoided, given the awakening of China, the integration of Europe, and the revival of Russia? And what would be the cost of trying to avoid it? US military spending already is roughly equal to that of the rest of the world combined.
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| 9 |
ID:
065596
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| 10 |
ID:
056707
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| 11 |
ID:
083775
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the past two decades, the American political imagination has been possessed by a hazardous geopolitical vision; the United States is defined as the dominant power in a closely integrated and 'unipolar' international system. A century of history has done much to encourage this view. Americans have trouble realising how revolutionary and threatening their unipolar vision can appear to others. A world system dominated by one superpower is a bold and radical programme. If successful, it would mean, for the first time in modern history, a world without a general balance of power. Pursuing such a goal implies numerous confrontations with other nations. It antagonises both states that fear decline and those that anticipate improvement. Nevertheless, Americans now find it difficult to entertain any other view of the world. They have been slow to see, let alone accept, what to many others seems a more probable and desirable future - a plural world with several centres of power
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| 12 |
ID:
079563
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| 13 |
ID:
138604
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| Summary/Abstract |
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century has attracted a great deal of attention, and deservedly so. It is a seductive book that soars above the myopia of ordinary economic analysis. It summons rich visions of the past and future and explores their myriad linkages. The result is a complex chain of arguments, inevitably with disruptive disconnections.
In the end, perhaps the author suggests more redistribution than his proposals
would deliver.
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