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| 1 |
ID:
108412
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has grown increasingly dependent on imports of oil and, as a consequence, has become a major and very visible player in the international energy markets. For a country which has traditionally been strongly committed to the principle of self-reliance, this dependence on foreign oil has been a source of vulnerability and anxiety. But it has also been a strategic opportunity for China to chart its own ambitions and objectives as a global economic and political actor. This article addresses the various ways in which China has incorporated its energy import needs within its foreign policy. There are, it is argued, three dimensions to this. There is, first, integration and cooperation with the West and other large oil-importing countries and a shift away from neo-mercantilism to a growing reliance on international markets. Second, there is a complementary strategy of balancing, which seeks to develop the energy resources close to its borders, in Russia and Central Asia, which are not so vulnerable to western intervention. And third, there is the construction, though preliminary and nascent at the moment, of a hegemonic order which challenges the US and the West in the critical maritime routes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and through to the Persian Gulf region.
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| 2 |
ID:
108086
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2011.
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| Description |
xiv, 233p.
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| Standard Number |
9780415603959, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056348 | 338.272820951/AND 056348 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
065628
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| 4 |
ID:
150538
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| 5 |
ID:
077893
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While historical sociology (HS) has declined in the UK, its position in the United States is much more secure. This article analyses the divergent paths of HS in both the UK and the US in order to provide some lessons for international relations (IR) in both countries. The article argues that HS in the US has been more successful in defining its particular contribution - the pursuit of important, macro-oriented research. The main benefit that HS can bring to IR is the provision of this 'intellectual space' allied to an engagement with 'big issues'. The article traces such a contribution in three areas: the state, civil society and democratization; nationalism and ethnic conflict; and Islam and the Middle East. The article concludes by arguing that the adoption of HS may have the added benefit of transcending the exigencies of the present-day and the parochialism of Western and Eurocentric concerns found in much contemporary IR
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| 6 |
ID:
078632
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007.
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| Description |
vii, 263p.
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| Standard Number |
9780745635415
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052564 | 355.033/DAN 052564 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
095118
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
To what extent does Russia face the threat of Islamic radicalization? This article provides an assessment of the nature and severity of the threat and its changing dynamics from the Yeltsin to the Putin periods in post-Soviet Russia. It argues that, contrary to many accounts, the threat was at its greatest during the late 1990s and in the Yeltsin period. Moreover, the Putin administration adopted a series of policies that have had some significant successes in stemming the flow of Islamic radicalism within Russia. This has involved a policy mix, including repression and coercion, most notably in the military campaign in Chechnya; diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and broader Muslim world to improve Russia's image; pro-active domestic policies to co-opt and support moderate Russian Muslim leaders and their communities; and attempts to construct a national identity and ideology which supports the multi-confessional and multinational nature of the Russian state and recognizes the Muslim contribution to Russian statehood and nationality. Although these policies have had their successes, there are also significant limitations, the most notable of which is the failure to address the problems of poor governance in the North Caucasus, which has sustained the Islamist insurgency in the region. The failure to develop an intermediary Muslim civil society in Russia more generally also contributes to the continuing appeal of Islamist radicalism, particularly among younger Russian Muslims.
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| 8 |
ID:
112157
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2012.
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This essay argues that, although it is tempting to view Russian policies through a revived Cold War paradigm, this is a problematic and ultimately misguided approach. Such an approach ignores the significant sources of discontinuity and rupture between the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. The essay presents an alternative framework for understanding and conceptualising Russia's engagement with the Middle East. This has three dimensions and takes an 'inside-out' approach. First, there are the domestic drivers for Russian engagement which is linked to the perceived need to counter the threat of secessionism in the North Caucasus and the potential broader radicalisation of Russia's Muslim population. Second, there are the more strictly economic interests in the Middle East, which include increasingly important trading relations with moderate pro-Western states in the region. And, third, there are the geopolitical considerations which certainly include potential competition with the West but also incorporate Russian ambitions to promote its credentials as a responsible great power supporting international norms, such as the principle of non-proliferation and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The tension and conflict between these two strands of Russian policy making have been notably present in Moscow's responses to the Arab Spring.
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| 9 |
ID:
071745
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2006.
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| Description |
xii, 262p.
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| Standard Number |
0415401909
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051232 | 355.03351821/DAN 051232 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
072930
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| Publication |
London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002.
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| Description |
115p.
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| Series |
Adelphi Paper, 346
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| Standard Number |
0198516754
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045769 | 333.790951/AND 045769 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
105946
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article challenges the common assumption that the external actors involved in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) are driven either by neo-realist strategic competition or by the constraining power of domestic lobbies, or by a mixture of both. Such implicit assumptions are evident in the controversial argument of the power of the 'Israel lobby' as promoted by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. This article argues that approaches based on such assumptions fail to explain adequately the policies adopted not only by the United States, but also by other key external actors who have been historically engaged in the MEPP - the Soviet Union and the European Union. A better explanatory framework is provided by treating the MEPP as an institution and by applying a historical institutionalist approach to the development of the MEPP, using such concepts as critical junctures, path dependence and positive feedback to analyse how the main external actors involved in the MEPP came to adopt their distinctive national approaches to the peace process. In particular, it is the responses of these actors to certain critical junctures, most notably but not exclusively to the period of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, that has had a particularly strong influence on policy formulation. For the US case, the creative policymaking of Henry Kissinger during the period after the 1973 war, which was subsequently incorporated into the US conceptualization of the MEPP, provides powerful and generally unrecognized insights into the initial puzzle identified by Walt and Mearsheimer - the consistent and almost unconditional support given to Israel by the United States despite the strategic problems this creates for broader US Middle East policy.
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| 12 |
ID:
079045
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much of the post-Cold War discourse about contemporary warfare posits a binary opposition between a 'democratic peace' in the North and the prevalence of virulent 'new wars' in the South. This article seeks to qualify these accounts by bringing out the deeper historical and sociological legacies of state formation critical for understanding the emergence of an internal peace amongst developed countries and the continuing insecurity and multiple civil wars in many poorer developing regions. It is argued that two features of Southern state formation - the external imposition of states and the enforced norm against territorial aggrandisement - have significantly constrained the development of many developing states, making it more difficult for them to forge strong, synergistic states whose security concerns are externally- rather than internally-oriented. The article argues that there is, though, much variation in how Southern states have responded to these historical legacies of state formation. The article concludes with a four-fold taxonomy to replace the simple North-South bifurcation, differentiating between developed, globalising, praetorian and failed states and identifying the differing potential for, and incidence of, violent conflict, insecurity, and war within these four types of state
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