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| 1 |
ID:
116164
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are considerable concerns about public perceptions of intelligence stemming directly from the highly politicized nature of intelligence estimates in the run-up to the US-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this article we use a new public attitudes dataset to provide the first ever analysis of British public confidence in MI6 and Government use of intelligence. The article demonstrates that the public have relatively high confidence in the intelligence produced by MI6 but are extremely sceptical about how the Government will present that intelligence. Using an ordered logit model this article then examines the factors that influence public perceptions of both intelligence and Government, finding that women are a lot less confident in both the intelligence services and government presentation of intelligence than men, suggesting that this might help explain gender differences in support for military action. The study also demonstrates that party identifiers and Catholics have very low confidence in the intelligence produced by MI6. The study shows that public confidence in both government and intelligence has a strong effect on support for preventive military action against terror camps, suggesting that the intelligence agencies need to avoid being contaminated by political agendas as much as possible if the intelligence case for future military actions is to be supported by the public.
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| 2 |
ID:
163453
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In contrast to the expansive literature on military casualties and support for war, we know very little about public reactions to foreign civilian casualties. This article, based on representative sample surveys in the United States and Britain, reports four survey experiments weaving information about civilian casualties into vignettes about Western military action. These produce consistent evidence of civilian casualty aversion: where death tolls were higher, support for force was invariably and significantly lower. Casualty effects were moderate in size but robust across our two cases and across different scenarios. They were also strikingly resistant to moderation by other factors manipulated in the experiments, such as the framing of casualties or their religious affiliation. The importance of numbers over even strongly humanizing frames points toward a utilitarian rather than a social psychological model of casualty aversion. Either way, civilian casualties deserve a more prominent place in the literature on public support for war.
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| 3 |
ID:
114134
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper applies theories of strategic conflict avoidance and diversionary war to help explain US-Iranian interactions. The article argues that US attempts at coercive diplomacy have tended to strengthen hardliners in Iran by allowing them to frame opposition to government policies as support for the United States. In particular, US public uncertainty about the advisability of using force against Iran provided both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian President with an opportunity to increase tensions with the United States with little concern about provoking a military strike. The aggressive stance of the Iranian regime is about developing a threat which diverts attention from domestic problems and places it firmly in the arena of the international.
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| 4 |
ID:
023117
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| Publication |
Oct 2002.
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| Description |
672-692
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| 5 |
ID:
082627
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| 6 |
ID:
143297
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article bridges the divide between comparative politics and international relations by examining the interaction between domestic instability and policy choices made at the domestic and international level. It is theorized that leaders select from a basket of options that include diversion, repression, and political concessions. It is argued that governmental institutions affect political leaders choices, with more domestically constrained democratic governments eschewing the use of repression, instead opting for diversion and concessions. Whereas autocratic governments will use repression as it is the most effective and least costly option. Using a panel vector autoregression model, the study tests whether political leaders use one or a mixture of responses when confronted with widespread dissatisfaction. The analysis models feedback loops enabling it to simultaneously evaluate the effectiveness of those strategies at reducing instability within the different institutional contexts. The study found little evidence of diversion, but it did find that the international environment affects both policy choices and affected the level of instability in the state. The use of concessions for all states is generally counterproductive when that state is involved in a strategic rivalry whereas they tend to reduce instability when both democracies and autocracies are in a more peaceful international environment.
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| 7 |
ID:
082413
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The study, using an autoregressive model and a time series of events data, tests whether Iran, Syria and North Korea have altered their behaviour towards the USA in response to the US occupation of Iraq. In particular, the study posits a modified theory of `strategic conflict avoidance', suggesting that perceived failings in US policy towards Iraq that manifest in low popularity ratings have, in fact, constrained the US president from initiating future aggressive actions. Potential targets of US aggression, rather than becoming more cooperative towards an unpopular US president, as suggested by strategic conflict avoidance theory, now become more hostile as they take advantage of public unease with an adventurous foreign policy. The analysis provides mixed support for the hypothesis, finding that North Korea has altered its strategic conflict avoidance behaviour in response to the Iraq occupation. Syria has become more hostile towards the USA, whereas, surprisingly, Iran is relatively uninfluenced by US domestic politics. The article suggests that coercive strategies might provide an opening in current US negotiations with North Korea, but also worryingly concludes, on the basis of the evidence, that the chances of a negotiated settlement with Iran are small
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