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ID:
084349
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Third-party actors who mediate or monitor peace often strive to uphold an image of neutrality. Yet, they commonly face accusations of partiality. The Nordic engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process is an illustration of this puzzle: despite the efforts to uphold an image of being neutral mediators and monitors, they have been seen as favoring one side or the other. This article suggests that part of the explanation for their failure to be seen as neutral lies in the fact that armed conflicts are characterized by certain asymmetries between the main antagonists - in capabilities, status and behavior. These imbalances pose particular challenges to the third party aspiring to act in a neutral manner. We suggest that third parties have two strategies available to deal with imbalances in the relationship between the contenders: 1) they can choose to disregard the asymmetrical relationship and act in an even-handed manner or 2) they can seek to counterbalance the lopsidedness. This article explores the dynamics of these strategies by analyzing the Nordic involvement in Sri Lanka's peace process that began in 2002.
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| 2 |
ID:
065706
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| 3 |
ID:
129049
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study presents a comparative analysis of two case studies in which attempts were made to resolve intractable ethno-national conflicts: the peace process undertaken in Aceh between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, which led to the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (mou) ending the conflict in Aceh; and the process conducted in the Sri Lanka conflict from 2001 through 2004 between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers, which failed to yield an agreement. The two peace processes will be examined using readiness theory, which focuses on the factors influencing the decision to enter into negotiations. This article also attempts to extend the hypotheses of readiness theory to explore the process of concession-making during the negotiations that took place in the two case studies. The findings indicate that the theory does contribute to understanding the dynamics of the pre-negotiation in both case studies and that applying its hypotheses may contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of the process of reaching an agreement in the Aceh process and of the factors leading to the failure of the negotiations in the Sri Lanka conflict. The analysis also gives rise to some questions that challenge readiness theory and its hypotheses - empirically and methodologically.
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| 4 |
ID:
133585
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
What role do third parties play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to what extent do domestic political constraints shape this role? Answering these questions has important ramifications for understanding the interplay between domestic and international politics. One useful tool to conduct this research is the two-stage decision-making framework, Poliheuristic (Ph) Decision Theory, which eliminates options from the choice set that do not meet domestic political requirements. This paper applies Ph theory to a case study from the conflict's infancy, the British decision in 1922 to affirm the policy of a Jewish national home (based on the Balfour Declaration 1917) despite violent Arab opposition. It argues that the decision was based solely on domestic political needs and did not attempt to address tensions in Palestine. It concludes that Ph theory provides a highly effective theory of decision-making for assessing motivations and policy decisions of third parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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| 5 |
ID:
114813
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A compromise is an agreement that involves mutual concessions. Each party gets less than it feels entitled to, but agrees to it because the situation it anticipates under the deal is better than the one it expects in the absence of a deal: conflict, exit or arbitration by a third party. Some compromises, however, are bad, and others are good. This article discusses three conjectures about what it is that makes a compromise good. Is a good compromise an honourable compromise, one that enables each party to save face? Is it rather a fair compromise, one that contributes to the progress of justice independently defined? Or is it a Pareto-improving compromise, one that changes things in such a way that it ends up making everyone better off than under the status quo? A compromise is never as good as a consensus, but it is generally better than nothing, and often achievable when a consensus is not. And when it is, trying to make it as good as possible in each of the three ways described is always worthwhile.
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