| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
170556
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a start to defence reforms. This should improve jointmanship in peacetime; however, joint wartime performance needs further reform and improvement. We face three problems: (i) historical lack of unified warfighting strategy formulation at the apex military level; (ii) the unclear division of responsibility and resources between service Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-Cs); and (iii) the differing natures of command and control between the three services, which manifest as differences in structural organisations. Treating India as one unified theatre can reduce these problems. It will allow the creation of a joint structure for strategy formulation at the apex level, resulting in one national strategy to guide subordinate strategy. Also, it will give ownership of all warfighting assets to a single commander who can centralise or decentralise at will, and yet not preclude formation of smaller military entities with collocated headquarters (HQ) of subordinate service formations. Examples from history support the arguments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
006988
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Aug 2000.
|
| Description |
1017-1020
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
127754
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
176400
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
170553
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence portends better civil-military cooperation. That India’s civil-military cooperation was in need of structural reform was never doubted. Yet, the implementation of such reform lacked political will, faced bureaucratic resistance, and was stymied by elements within the armed services. Political will has finally expressed itself and taken three major steps: the institution of the posts of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC-COSC), and the creation of DMA with the CDS as its ex-officio head. Notably, the DMA is expected to have some optimum mix of civil and military domain experts that would work under a military head who is the Principal Military Adviser to the Defence Minister.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
166131
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The appointment of a CDS for the Indian Armed Forces is the single most procrastinated decision of the political establishment. From perceived fear of a possible military takeover, to pure government antipathy, to the turf wars between the Services, the issue of CDS has been on the backburner.
The radical changes undertaken by the US to facilitate evolution of Joint Chief of Staff into an institutionalised structure is an excellent case study. The ‘Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act’ of 1986 completely transformed the US Armed Forces. India too had many opportunities where a CDS would have made an impact.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
018862
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
April 2001.
|
| Description |
89-104
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
081396
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
021878
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
May 2002.
|
| Description |
35-41
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
057809
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Jul-Sep 2004.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|