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| 1 |
ID:
066051
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| 2 |
ID:
140434
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| Publication |
Oxon, Routledge, 2015.
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| Description |
viii, 205p.: ill.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9780415643047
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058283 | 355.0201/ANG 058283 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
087991
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is widely claimed that the current British Maritime Doctrine is highly influenced by the ideas of British strategist and naval historian Sir Julian S. Corbett. These conclusions, however, rarely originate from systematic empirical investigations of the doctrine itself. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to investigate the intellectual bonds between Corbett and this particular doctrine. In order to bring structure and coherence to the investigation, distinctions are made between four different kinds of influence-formal and informal influence, as well as direct and indirect influence. Although Corbett's influence can certainly be established, it needs to be qualified in at least two respects: his ideas are much more influential in maritime/naval matters on the military-strategic level of war than on operational aspects, and his thinking often seems to be used to "intellectually" legitimize a proposition or a conclusion reached for other reasons. While focusing on certain aspects of Corbettian thinking and disregarding others, the authors of British Maritime Doctrine in fact often tend to quote not Corbett or his thinking, but rather his legend.
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| 4 |
ID:
108890
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article considers theoretical aspects of the non-belligerent and political use of naval forces, commonly described as naval diplomacy. It presents four arguments. Firstly, it criticises the often used term "gunboat diplomacy" for being too narrow, emotionally charged, and burdened by colonialism. Secondly, the theories on naval diplomacy are criticised for being better suited for doctrinal purposes than for analytical purposes. Thirdly, criticism is levelled against the term "naval presence," which is deemed insufficient as a focal point in a theory of naval diplomacy. Fourthly, elements of a workable theory of naval diplomacy are presented, including the political aim, naval means, diplomatic method, and geopolitical context. In conclusion, warships and navies are described as symbols of national sovereignty and power, and for having, not only a defence value, but also a symbolic, supportive, and coercive value.
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| 5 |
ID:
076552
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2007.
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This article deals with the specific views of the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) on the theoretical study of war, i.e. his theory on theory. What were Corbett's main ideas and how do they compare with those of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini? To what extent are Corbett's ideas original? The conclusions reached are that, first, the intellectual kinship between Corbett and Clausewitz is especially pronounced in this aspect of military theory. Second, the intellectual affinity between Corbett's and Jomini's views on the theoretical study of war is indeed negligible. Finally, it is argued that Corbett presents only one original idea regarding the theoretical study of war and that this idea is problematic.
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| 6 |
ID:
148051
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Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.
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| 7 |
ID:
149135
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2016.
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| Description |
ix, 179p.hbk
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| Series |
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series
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| Standard Number |
9781138248045
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058878 | 359.03092/WID 058878 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
076352
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few spy cases during the Cold War have such an international flavour as the Wennerström spy case - a neutral Swedish attaché spying on the West for the benefit of the East. Even 40 years later, however, the literature available on the case suffers from a Swedish bias and has generally received little scholarly treatment. Therefore, this article aims to describe and analyse the Wennerström spy case from a Western perspective, based on new declassified sources as well as the most recent research available in Swedish. Among other things, the article demonstrates that the investigation after Wennerström's arrest took place in close cooperation with primarily American and British intelligence services, that Wennerström's allegation of being a double agent was either false or greatly exaggerated, and, finally, that the damage done to Western interests due to his espionage was greater than portrayed in the existing literature.
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