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| 1 |
ID:
098766
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The advisory function can be assessed as a fallback procedure at a time when there is a lack of cases before international courts and tribunals. Although not legally binding and having no precedential effect, Advisory Opinions are generally accepted. This paper looks into the question of the Advisory Opinions in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) system. The advisory function of the Tribunal is exercised by the Seabed Disputes Chamber within the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The first request for an advisory opinion was filed on 14 May 2010. The full Court may, however, render an advisory opinion based on other international agreements according to Article 138 of the Rules of the ITLOS. As a rule, the advisory procedure is open to international organizations only. There are neither claims nor parties involved in this procedure. The paper tries to address the legal regime relating to the Opinions.
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| 2 |
ID:
109332
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| 3 |
ID:
090176
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When analysing China's naval development, international media naturally focus on the headline-grabbing platforms. The potential for an aircraft carrier and the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine garner the most attention.
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| 4 |
ID:
103783
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| 5 |
ID:
101117
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| 6 |
ID:
108690
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| 7 |
ID:
102921
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| 8 |
ID:
102930
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| 9 |
ID:
103435
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| 10 |
ID:
101784
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| 11 |
ID:
106394
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| 12 |
ID:
106683
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| 13 |
ID:
101186
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| 14 |
ID:
104652
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 'Cheonan' incident has prodded and expedited the strategic comeback of the US in East Asia. The US offer to mediate the territorial disputes over islands and seabed minerals in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 has provoked harsh criticism from the Chinese. This US diplomatic move appears to be a premeditated one to substantially diminish the influence of China in the region, to re-secure its own strategic forward military presence and to signal that it is not yet time for China to acquire absolute control over this critical waterway. The episode has rendered their mercurial relationship more problematic and makes the G-2 paradigm a fallacy.
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| 15 |
ID:
100630
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| 16 |
ID:
102922
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| 17 |
ID:
102926
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| 18 |
ID:
098477
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| 19 |
ID:
099689
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The parties vying for territories in the South China Sea need not fear China. Despite expanding its military presence in the South China Sea, China does not pose any palpable military threat to the region. On the contrary, a rich and strong China could be a stabilizing factor. Likewise, while there is no evidence to suggest that China, a country that depends on international trade to sustain its strategic interests globally, will interfere with the freedom of navigation as defined under customary international law in the South China Sea. However, as a proud nation with a long-established civilization it will not shy away from challenging what it considers to be unauthorized military activities in its maritime space that is within its national jurisdiction, the South China Sea included.
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| 20 |
ID:
102925
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