Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
143461
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Publication |
Taipei, Ministry of National Defense, 1998.
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Description |
234p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9571605220
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
039927 | 351.060951/TAI 039927 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
133960
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates how a collective memory of trauma was produced in the course of commemorating the 2-28 Incident in the context of the 2004 election campaign, and how this memory production led to the parallel formation of a Taiwanese national identity. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally was designed to remember the 2-28 Incident as a historical trauma in order to be forgotten. The remembering of the 2-28 Incident must be regarded as a constructive process as opposed to a retrieval process. The memory of the 2-28 Incident was selectively constituted in favor of sovereign power.
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3 |
ID:
139074
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Summary/Abstract |
In the closing stages of the Second World War, the world was divided into the capitalist side led by the United States and the communist side commanded by the USSR. A new bipolar structure called the “Cold War” was gradually established in the second part of the twentieth century. Basically this “cold” war structure was maintained between the two superpowers in the major areas of the world like Europe, but neither in the Korean peninsula nor in Vietnam, nor in Taiwan Strait since several “hot” wars took place in these regions.1 During that period, South
Korea, South Vietnam and Taiwan all had the support of the United States to resist the military threat of the other side supported by the communist USSR and China. Later, the capitalist South Vietnam was unable to resist the invasion of the North and collapsed. On the other hand, South Korea succeeded in developing the strength of the country and became a major middle power in the world. For strategic reasons, Taiwan lost formal political recognition of the world to the
profit of Communist China, but continues to flourish until now. The two Vietnams and the two Koreas all have similar sizes in term of territory and population. By contrast, China is 268 times larger than Taiwan calculated by territorial size, 60 times bigger by population power, and is actually the second largest global economic power after the United States. Without diplomatic allies, besides some smaller states, Taiwan still continues to prosper with its special security strategy. Seventy years after the end of the Second World War, this article aims to provide an understanding of the geopolitical strategy of Taiwan that continues to guarantee its future.
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4 |
ID:
113879
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, globalization has promoted the transnational mobility of talent from Japan to Taiwan. The Japanese Thin Film Transistor-Liquid Crystal Display industry's tacit technical knowledge flows via the Japanese talent drain, which may significantly shape Taiwan's future economic linkage with China.
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5 |
ID:
057939
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6 |
ID:
080497
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Publication |
2007.
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Summary/Abstract |
For emerging democracies, how to reach state-society equilibriums conducive to both democratization and effective governance has been a most challenging issue. Illustrating such a predicament, in present-day Taiwan a situation of 'divided government' has been widely regarded in the literature as implying frequent legislative-executive stalemate and ineffective governance. In this article, we argue that while power games among the three conventional branches of government - the executive, legislature, and judiciary - may continue to produce a governmental stalemate equilibrium, the entry of increasingly important media and interest group players into the policy-making arena in Taiwan has shown strong potential to make up for the institutional failing of divided government. Drawing on the adoption process of the 2001 Financial Holding Company Law, we examine the conditions under which effective governance can still be achieved in Taiwan. Our analysis shows that concerted media pressure can succeed in forcing Taiwan's major parties to jointly pursue beneficial legislation. The analysis also suggests that interest group involvement in Taiwanese policy-making does not necessarily lead to crippling 'regulatory capture' but, on the contrary, can entail welfare enhancing change
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7 |
ID:
091101
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper looks at how recent Japanese prime ministers have counterintuitively limited political control over the bureaucracy. It uses conflicts at the foreign and defense ministries to illustrate how the presence of multiple principals alters principal-agent theory and its implications for the politician-bureaucrat relationship. This study integrates the Japanese case into comparative scholarship on Taiwan and Korea.
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8 |
ID:
151250
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Summary/Abstract |
The relational turn of IR stresses the processual constitution of the state. The indigenous theory of Chinese IR adopts the relational turn but contends that the Chinese experiences are distinctive. Relying on the case of Singapore-Taiwan relationship, this paper argues that the Chinese relationality attests to a bilateral sensibility that does not confront the relational turn in general, which is multilateral. The case further contributes to the relational turn in showing non-security and affirmative components of relationality to the extent that the studies of the relational turn have remained embedded in the security concerns. The case applies the theory of “balance of relationship,” in which nations can practice self-restraint not in response to unilateral strategic calculus or multilateral rule making, but to bilateral reciprocity. The balance of relationship of the two proceeds at both the statist and the personal levels, introducing the affect of passion to the relational turn.
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9 |
ID:
124590
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10 |
ID:
108805
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11 |
ID:
054851
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12 |
ID:
161618
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper develops a two-dimensional concept of Sinophobia (恐中) to study Taiwanese attitudes toward mainland China as well as their sources and political consequences. Taiwanese skepticism toward China has grown in recent years, concomitant with increasing cross-Strait interactions and exchanges. This has been widely characterized as a “Sinophobia syndrome.” To investigate this phenomenon, we divide Sinophobia into two types—“group-difference-driven” and “risk-driven”—and investigate whether the two types exert different effects on individual preferences regarding policies involving China. Multivariate analyses show that a model that distinguishes between the two types of Sinophobia fits the data very well and that the risk-driven attitude influences decisions on issues related to China more strongly than does the group-difference-driven attitude. This finding suggests that although perceptions of group difference may prompt fears of China, it is not a powerful determinant of policy preferences. Additional analyses reveal that the risk-driven attitude also influences other policy-relevant attitudes and behavior, including voting in the 2012 presidential election.
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13 |
ID:
178406
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Summary/Abstract |
This study focuses on art projects that reflect human rights violations committed by the Guomindang (KMT) government on Taiwan during the Republic of China’s (ROC) White Terror Period between 1949 and 1991. It starts with a brief introduction to this historical period in Taiwan, followed by a discussion of artwork that seeks to preserve personal memories in the absence of official records. The paper contrasts official art projects initiated by KMT and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations in recent decades that aim to address the difficulties of transitional justice, such as the silence of victims, fading memories, and misapprehensions between generations, with spontaneous artwork that responds to the official narratives of past injustice.
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14 |
ID:
096007
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
The political roles of Taiwanese business people (taishang) in cross-strait relations have been increasingly noteworthy under Hu Jintao's policy of "counting on the Taiwanese people." But contrary to widely accepted allegations, this paper argues that attempts by China to use Taiwanese business people as a means to gain political leverage over Taiwan will probably not pan out as a successful strategy.
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15 |
ID:
158651
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Summary/Abstract |
Under what conditions does foreign aid in the aftermath of war foster state-building? This article argues that institutional legacy and continuity and the politics of aid may matter. In the aftermath of war, for an aid regime to reinforce state-building, it may need to ensure continuity in the strength of the state and to use recipient mechanisms and finance policies that generate a greater state capacity. The existence and continuity of a Weberian state may increase the likelihood of effective state-building. If the state is relatively strong, with a Weberian bureaucracy, aid can further reinforce it when aid is spent through national systems or is aligned with local priorities, with efforts to ensure that the recipient leaders reinforce state effectiveness by implementing policies that may require greater state capacity. Evidence for this argument is provided through pairwise comparison of state-building patterns between South Korea and Taiwan.
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16 |
ID:
162176
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17 |
ID:
097454
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18 |
ID:
079587
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19 |
ID:
073075
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20 |
ID:
177621
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Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have pointed to the period 1958-1962 as the beginning of Taiwan's transition to export-oriented industrialization. Although the Nationalist Party (KMT) had traditionally supported state socialism, the KMT began to oversee economic reforms in the late 1950s, setting Taiwan on the course of export-led growth under a capitalist model. Using archival materials from both the United States and Taiwan, I argue that the reforms resulted from U.S. influence on how the KMT understood the role of economic development in its grand strategy. U.S. arguments succeeded in creating political support at the highest levels of the KMT leadership for a reform-oriented faction in the economic bureaucracy. This finding shows how an aid donor can promote economic reforms even when the recipient is strategically important for the donor: although threats to enforce conditionality may not be credible, the donor can influence the recipient through persuasion.
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