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ID:
154354
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| Summary/Abstract |
The present fire and forget style of weapons development has not worked and will not work in hundred years. The development of weapons independence will need the active and sustained collaboration of the four constituents of the POBAT and that too in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect.This, the cabinet must lead and ensure. Left to the politicians alone, they will ignore it till too late. Left solely to the bureaucracy, the threat will be downplayed in the name of looking for seeking diplomatic solutions. Quite understandably, the Armed Forces, acting alone, will over prepare for a worst possible scenario. The solution would be unaffordable and unsustainable. Left to the technocrats, we will have we shall a technical chaos - an enjoyable technical picnic but too aften very little by way of timely hardware in service.
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| 2 |
ID:
007051
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| Publication |
July 2000.
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| Description |
42-45
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| 3 |
ID:
062739
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| 4 |
ID:
062845
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| 5 |
ID:
105044
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals' level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals' efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher's roughly articulated concept of 'plunging'. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model's implications for current US military force structure planning.
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| 6 |
ID:
085212
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