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| 1 |
ID:
020482
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| Publication |
Nov 2001.
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| Description |
553-572
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| Summary/Abstract |
The two goals of the 1998 State Council organizational streamlining were personnel reduction and a change of government functions. It is argued that the methods being used to achieve personnel reduction do not constitute a real reduction but largely involve transferring staff to other public institutions. Real personnel reduction could not be achieved without a major change of government function. Institutional reforms of both the central and local governments since the 1980s have been adaptations to the changing economic structure from a planned to a market economy. Government functions have served both existing economies. Cadres cannot be reduced unless the government function of direct management of state-enterprises is completely severed. The major contents of the 1998 institutional reform are examined and evaluated. The prospects for the success of the reform are also assessed
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| 2 |
ID:
020570
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| Publication |
Nov-Dec 2001.
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| Description |
3-12
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| 3 |
ID:
058760
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| 4 |
ID:
022052
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| Publication |
July-Aug 2002.
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| Description |
9-15
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| 5 |
ID:
020639
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2002.
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| Description |
29-37
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| 6 |
ID:
019762
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| Publication |
July-Sept 2001.
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| Description |
229-275
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| 7 |
ID:
015275
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| Publication |
Feb 15, 1993.
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| Description |
8-15
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| 8 |
ID:
018468
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| Publication |
Jan 2001.
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| Description |
26-30
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| 9 |
ID:
053497
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| 10 |
ID:
018239
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| Publication |
Nov 2000.
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| Description |
489-512
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of repeated crackdowns on the 'three disorders' and 'small treasuries', it is obvious that local governments in China collect substantial amounts of illegal monies. What is not immediately obvious is how illegal monies matter. In this article, I assess both the amount of illegal monies that local governments collect and their significance relative to local autonomy. I find that because illegal monies are not rival to legal monies but rather complementary, although illegal monies may give local governments a greater ability to pursue their own particularistic agendas, they do not fundamentally alter the principalagent structures that link the localities to the center.
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| 11 |
ID:
016970
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| Publication |
May-June 1994.
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| Description |
28-42
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| 12 |
ID:
007096
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| Publication |
Summer 1999.
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| Description |
81-110
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| 13 |
ID:
022000
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| Publication |
May/June 2002.
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| Description |
522-540
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| 14 |
ID:
050741
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| 15 |
ID:
018240
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| Publication |
Nov 2000.
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| Description |
513-534
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper explains why rural enterprises prosper in the post-Mao reform era. Based on a case study of Shaanxi province, the paper argues that the institutional arrangements in rural China under economic reforms are conducive to sustained economic growth because the principal–agent problem is alleviated in two dimensions. First, the interests of local government officials and enterprises overlap. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly the 1994 tax-assignment reform, local governments are eager to promote local industrial growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labour and contributing to the provision of communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provide local governments with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, local governments provide preferential aid to their enterprises in the form of tax and credit privileges. Second, the principal–agent problem is abated by a closer effort-and-reward link for the various parties involved in the operation of rural enterprises.
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| 16 |
ID:
053907
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| Publication |
Jul-Aug 2004.
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| 17 |
ID:
019780
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| Publication |
June 2001.
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| Description |
163-180
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| 18 |
ID:
020640
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2002.
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| Description |
38-47
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| 19 |
ID:
019140
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| Publication |
2000.
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| Description |
232-245
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| 20 |
ID:
061508
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