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| 1 |
ID:
166084
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| Summary/Abstract |
It may have been the strangest christening in the history of modern shipbuilding. In April 2016, the U.S. Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) celebrated the initial launch of Sea Hunter, a sleek, 132-foot-long trimaran that one observer aptly described as “a Klingon bird of prey.” More unusual than its appearance, however, is the size of the its permanent crew: zero.
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| 2 |
ID:
130650
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| 3 |
ID:
191503
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper addresses topical issues of the development of the art of war as reflected in the works of great military theorists and commanders from the time of Sun Tzu until now.
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| 4 |
ID:
071106
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| 5 |
ID:
120313
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article suggests an agenda for juridical civil-military relations by considering how recent developments in human rights law in Europe breed new forms of juridical civil-military relations. The argument is that the human right driven recasting of legal authority over military affairs from military justice systems to civilian justice systems entwines these systems. Furthermore, that in so far the theories and studies of civil-military relations have not yet addressed the juridical dimension of civil-military relations as a subject of its own right, this entwining calls for a new subject in the study of civil-military relations, straddling the institutional entwining as well as the sociological dimension of practical cooperation.
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| 6 |
ID:
151764
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| Summary/Abstract |
Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations.
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| 7 |
ID:
069826
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| 8 |
ID:
169103
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The cessation of military confrontations rarely coincides with the end of war. Legal and political matters continue after the last shot has been fired, civilians driven from their homes try to rebuild their houses and their lives, veterans need to adapt to their new role in civil society, and the struggle to define the history and the significance of past events only begins. In recent years, in particular, the changes in the character of contemporary warfare have created uncertainties across different disciplines about how to identify and conceptualise the end of war. It is therefore an opportune moment to examine how wars end from a multidisciplinary perspective that combines enquiries into the politics of war, the laws of war and the military and intellectual history of war. This approach enables both an understanding of how ‘the end’ as a concept informs the understanding of war in international relations, in international law and in history and a reconsideration of the nature of scientific method in the field of war studies as such.
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| 9 |
ID:
066628
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| 10 |
ID:
159303
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On December 25, 2017, Maj. Gen. Stepan A. Tyushkevich, Professor, Doctor of Philosophy, the U.S.S.R. State Prize laureate, Merited Scientist of the RSFSR, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, celebrated his 100th birthday. The paper covers the contribution of Dr. Tyushkevich to the development of military science in this country.
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| 11 |
ID:
135378
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author reviews S. V. Fomov’s article, “A Pragmatic view of war and ways to Avert It,” focuses on several flaws in S Fomov’s approach and offering his own interpretation of the causes and laws of war as concepts in military theory.
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| 12 |
ID:
090359
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the US response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks using Carl Schmitt's concept of the exception. It argues that the Bush administration's response is consistent with Schmitt's view, which argued that US policy continued the historical practice of drawing lines that separated 'civilisation' from zones of exception where the normal laws governing warfare did not apply. This suggests that the state of exception declared after 9/11 is not contingent on the rise and fall of the terrorist threat, rather it is the latest manifestation of 'global linear thinking' and therefore a permanent feature of American hegemony. However, the article does not accept this pessimistic conclusion. US policy since 9/11 fits squarely with a Schmittian explanation only because conservative nationalists have used the war on terror to help reconstruct a sense of American 'exceptionalism'. An alternative reading of how American liberalism should respond to terrorism can be found in the manner in which the Bush administration's policy was rejected by the US Supreme Court.
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| 13 |
ID:
171603
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| 14 |
ID:
081991
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The critique of the laws of war (and international law in general) coming out of America as the war on terror began seemed to have emerged as a response to the horror of 9/11 and the belief that the United States was now engaged in a "new paradigm" of warfare. However, the Bush administration's argument needs to be situated in a wider historical context. The source of the arguments against applying the Geneva Conventions to the prisoners caught in Afghanistan emerged well before 9/11 and can be traced to the end of the Cold War. These doctrines emerged out of the work of the "new sovereigntists" and out of the frustrations guided by coalition warfare. This paper seeks to trace the origin of these arguments which challenge the traditional division between jus ad bellum (the law governing the resort to force) and jus in bello (the law governing tactics in warfare).
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| 15 |
ID:
151568
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The ban on inter-state war in the UN Charter is widely identified as central to the modern international order–Michael Byers calls it ‘one of the twentieth century’s greatest achievements’. Even if it is only imperfectly observed, it is often seen as a constraint on state autonomy and an improvement on the pre-legal, unregulated world before 1945. In response to this conventional view, this article shows that the laws on war in the Charter are better seen as permissive rather than constraining. I make two points. First, by creating a legal category around ‘self-defence’, the laws on war authorise, and thus legitimate, wars that are motivated by the security needs of the state, while forbidding other motives for wars. Second, state practice since 1945 has expanded the scope of this authorisation, extending it in both time and space beyond the black-letter text of the Charter. The permissive effect of law on war has therefore been getting larger. These two effects suggest that international law is a resource that increases state power, at least for powerful states, and this relation between international law and power politics is missed by both realists and liberal internationalists.
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| 16 |
ID:
151761
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Most wars today are civil wars, but we have little understanding of the conditions under which rebel groups might comply with the laws of war. i ask three questions in this essay: What do the laws of war require of rebels, or armed nonstate actors (ansas)? To what extent are rebels aware of the laws of war? Under what conditions do rebel groups comply with international humanitarian law? i argue that the war aims of rebel groups are key to understanding their relationship with the laws of war. In particular, secessionist rebel groups – those that seek a new, independent state – are especially likely to comply with the laws of war as a means to signal their capacity and willingness to be good citizens of the international community to which they seek admission.
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| 17 |
ID:
111922
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The ongoing War on Terror and the rise of nonstate actors in armed conflicts around the world have led both critics and proponents of international law to argue the Geneva Conventions currently governing warfare are no longer relevant. Yet what are the prospects for a new Geneva Convention to take hold in the international community? In order to begin to address this issue, I examine the factors influencing the decision of states to commit to the existing laws of war. Using an event history analysis of the ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, I find formative events involving past experience with war, as well as several other domestic and external factors, shape the incentives to commit to international law. In particular, far from pushing war-torn states to join international agreements in the hopes of mitigating the costs of armed conflict, the legacy of war makes states less willing to be constrained by international humanitarian law. The findings have implications for the role of formative events on incentives for international cooperation and foreshadow that the path toward widespread acceptance of any new Geneva Convention, should one ever be negotiated, would likely be formidable.
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| 18 |
ID:
193657
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| Summary/Abstract |
Histories of political science and of the laws of war identify the nineteenth-century scholar Francis Lieber as their modern founder. His 1863 General Orders 100 codified the modern laws of war, internationalizing his political thought. Yet, relatively unremarked is that Lieber wrote his foundational texts during U.S. settler colonization, which he justified in whole. I argue that GO100 facilitated settler colonial violence by defining modern war as a public war, arrogating it to sovereign states; distinguishing revenge from retaliation, attributing revenge to the “savage”; and elevating a certain racialized/gendered governance, ascribing it to the Cis-Caucasian race. Producing Native peoples and Native wars as lacking in the proper characteristics of sovereign belligerency resulted in a subordination of status and a legitimation of exterminatory tactics that were subsequently universalized and (re)internationalized through GO100’s determinative influence on the laws of war. Tracing GO100 further exposes the founding of the discipline in Native peoples’ dispossession and extermination.
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| 19 |
ID:
175080
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| Summary/Abstract |
In “Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” a pathbreaking survey of attitudes toward the laws of war published in the summer 2017 issue of International Security, Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino found that Americans are relatively insensitive to the targeting of civilian populations and to international norms and taboos against the use of nuclear weapons. We replicated a key question of this study, where respondents were asked if they would support saturation bombing an Iranian city to end a war. We also introduced some variations into the experiment to directly measure any potential influence of international norms and laws. Overall, our quantitative and qualitative findings are more optimistic than those of Sagan and Valentino's study: Americans do strongly believe it is wrong to target civilians. And in a real-life scenario such as this, a majority would likely oppose such a bombing. These findings suggest, however, that much depends on how survey questions are structured in measuring those preferences and whether legal or ethical considerations are part of any national conversation about war policy.
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| 20 |
ID:
153845
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| Summary/Abstract |
The laws of war are under mounting pressure and yet recent developments in the ethics of war have encouraged a growing disjunction between ethics and the law. Is this a problem, and does just war have a responsibility to address it? How then should we think about the relationship between ethics and law in war? Focusing on the debates between orthodox and revisionist theorists about principles of liability and immunity in war, I argue that these are actually about competing conceptions of justness. Revisionists privilege a ‘best ethics’ approach to justness, whereas orthodox theorists tend to work within a more rounded conception that embraces the legal and political dimensions of the regulation of war. I argue that there is a danger that those revisionist theorists, despite their impressive ethical innovations, nonetheless operate in a reductive way that does little to assist with the contemporary plight of law, and may inadvertently offer but ‘miserable comfort’ to those caught up in the battlefield. In contrast, the just war tradition generally is rooted in a practice that makes greater allowance for a politically configured concept of war, and takes more seriously the requirement for effective law.
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