| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
066727
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
095994
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
US and Russian leaders have indicated that the next round of US-Russian strategic arms negotiations, after a START follow-on treaty is agreed and ratified, is likely to tackle non-strategic, or 'tactical', nuclear weapons. Control of such weapons has remained elusive, despite the fact that they are particularly attractive to terrorists and present a greater risk than strategic weapons of early or accidental use. In 1991, US President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made parallel, but unilateral, pledges - collectively known as the presidential nuclear initiatives - to reduce the numbers of their tactical nuclear weapons and store the larger part of their arsenals in central storage (which was not defined). Washington, however, did not accept a Soviet proposal made that autumn to negotiate a legally binding, verifiable treaty. The two countries have made much progress towards meeting their initiative commitments, but there have been no further serious negotiations on the issue despite many rounds of strategic arms reduction talks. The intention of US and Russian officials to finally tackle the issue of tactical nuclear weapons is welcome, yet linking the two classes of nuclear weapons at an early stage in the next round of post-START negotiations might result in more problems than it can solve.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
171560
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The risk of use of nuclear weapons among the great powers is greater today than since the height of the Cold War. Growing political-military competition has increased the possibility of a U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Chinese military conflict. Any such conflict would carry with it the danger of escalation across the nuclear threshold, most probably driven by misinterpretation and miscalculation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|