Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
112582
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Publication |
New Delhi, Rupa & Co., 2009.
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Description |
xvii, 200p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056536 | 355.4051/RAJ 056536 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
100635
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3 |
ID:
093317
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Publication |
New Delhi, KW Publishers, 2009.
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Description |
33p.
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Series |
Manekshaw paper no. 16
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Standard Number |
9789380502137
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
054631 | 327.174/RAJ 054631 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
023050
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Publication |
2002.
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Description |
370-379
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5 |
ID:
171174
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Summary/Abstract |
Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.
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6 |
ID:
152280
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Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the contrary approaches and perceptions of India and China across the economic, political and military domains including the unresolved border and territorial issues, China’s South Asia policy, military modernisation and nuclear competition, border infrastructure and its impact on military build-up in the border areas. In particular, the article investigates how India–China relations have changed under Chinese President Xi Jinping. Although some continuity is discerned in China’s policies, there is also greater aggressiveness and more vigorous efforts to balance India on China’s part.
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7 |
ID:
110119
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8 |
ID:
110118
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9 |
ID:
019589
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Publication |
2001.
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Description |
545-556
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10 |
ID:
019595
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Publication |
2001.
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Description |
617-620
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11 |
ID:
187486
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12 |
ID:
183385
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Publication |
New Delhi, ORF, 2017.
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Description |
xiv, 388p.pbk
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Standard Number |
9788186818282
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
060135 | 358.8/RAJ 060135 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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13 |
ID:
083931
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
Chinese military modernization and its resulting aggressive posturing have serious implications for Asian stability and Indian security. This article is an attempt to understand the main security challenges from a Chinese perspective; the kind of responses, especially military, that China has undertaken; and the way Chinese military strategy has evolved from Mao's People's War days to a modern hi-tech military force today. In the short run Chinese military objectives appear focused on finding ways to defeat the United States in the event of a conflict between the two countries, possibly over Taiwan. But the long-term consequences of Chinese strategy remain uncertain, at least partly because the rise of China, on which that military power will depend, is itself difficult to predict with certainty.
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