| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
067312
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
085126
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian "unjust enemy."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
079791
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Frankfurt, Peace Research Institute frankfurt, 2007.
|
| Description |
41p.
|
| Series |
PRIF Report; no.79
|
| Standard Number |
9783937829524
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052773 | 358.38/BEC 052773 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| D52773 | 358.38/BEC D52773 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
072883
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2005.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|