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| 1 |
ID:
080592
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| 2 |
ID:
084655
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| 3 |
ID:
067333
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| 4 |
ID:
163311
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| Summary/Abstract |
We’ve been fighting for a long time in Syria,” said U.S. President Donald Trump in the last days of 2018. “Now it’s time for our troops to come back home.” The president’s surprise call for a rapid withdrawal of the nearly 2,000 U.S. troops stationed in Syria drew widespread criticism from members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. But it came as an even greater shock to the United States’ main partner in the fight against the Islamic State (or ISIS), the Syrian Kurds. For weeks prior to the announcement, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had been threatening to invade areas of northern Syria controlled by Kurdish militants. The only thing stopping him was the presence of U.S. troops. Removing them would leave the Kurds deeply exposed. “If [the Americans] will leave,” warned one Syrian Kurd, “we will curse them as traitors.”
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| 5 |
ID:
078046
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| 6 |
ID:
138612
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the first weeks of October this year, an array of tanks waited on Turkey’s southern border, their commanders watching carefully as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) fought to capture the nearby Syrian–Kurdish town of Kobane. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), the force defending the town and an offshoot of Turkish insurgent group the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK), sought help from the powers allied against ISIS: the European Union, NATO, the United Nations, Turkey and, above all, the United States. But Ankara was reluctant to directly intervene in Kobane; it refused to allow help to reach the defenders and denied Washington permission to fly offensive operations out of the US Air Force base at Incirlik, in southern Turkey. Despite the threat that ISIS posed to the country further down the line, Ankara’s preference appeared to be for the town to fall, thereby dealing a heavy blow to the Syrian Kurds.
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| 7 |
ID:
119357
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| Publication |
Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1998.
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| Description |
xix,239p.hbk
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| Contents |
B
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| Standard Number |
0847685527
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057193 | 956.100491597/BAR 057193 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
091464
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkey hopes to be a global power, but it has not yet become even the regional player that the ruling AKP declares it to be. Can the AKP do better, or will it be held back by its Islamist past and the conservative inclinations of its core constituents?
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| 9 |
ID:
116650
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At a first glance, Turkey and Iran, two of the Middle East's most powerful neighbouring states, are on opposite sides of a bloody civil war in Syria where the protagonists are determined to fight it to the bitter end. The two countries are also jockeying for influence in oil-rich Iraq where Sunni-Shia and Arab-Kurdish divisions make for an unstable mix. It is thus understandable that this rivalry has been the focus of much commentary, but competition is not novel to these countries, and the intensity of their current rivalry may be exaggerated.
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