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ID:
137446
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| 2 |
ID:
162457
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| Summary/Abstract |
Authoritarian regimes are not known for adopting independent courts, yet the frequency of states empowering their judiciaries has steadily increased. In 1961 only 9% of autocracies had a partially or fully independent court, but by 1987 more than one-third of authoritarian states had reformed their judiciaries. Initiating judicial reform is risky for a regime that seeks to maintain its authority over its populace, including risks to their preferred policy positions and judgments that run contrary to the preferences of the regime. Given these risks, why do authoritarian leaders often relinquish authority to independent courts? This article argues regime leaders will choose to empower at least nominally independent courts in order to resolve information problems that lead to bargaining failures and civil war. This project uses propensity score matching to account for the complex relationship between institutional arrangement and civil war, and finds that states that adopt an independent court reduce their risk of civil war between 54% and 75% when compared to states that are equally likely to have adopted an independent court, but did not. These results suggest that leaders seeking to reduce uncertainty when bargaining with potential oppositions groups have strong incentives to implement independent judiciaries, and improve our understanding of how and why authoritarian leaders choose to delegate authority to independent judicial institutions.
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| 3 |
ID:
140172
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do the outcomes of international wars affect domestic social change? In turn, how do changing patterns of social identification and domestic conflict affect a nation’s military capability? We propose a “second image reversed” theory of war that links structural variables, power politics, and the individuals that constitute states. Drawing on experimental results in social psychology, we recapture a lost building block of the classical realist theory of statecraft: the connections between the outcomes of international wars, patterns of social identification and domestic conflict, and the nation’s future war-fighting capability. When interstate war can significantly increase a state’s international status, peace is less likely to prevail in equilibrium because, by winning a war and raising the nation’s status, leaders induce individuals to identify nationally, thereby reducing internal conflict by increasing investments in state capacity. In certain settings, it is only through the anticipated social change that victory can generate that leaders can unify their nation, and the higher anticipated payoffs to national unification makes leaders fight international wars that they would otherwise choose not to fight. We use the case of German unification after the Franco-Prussian war to demonstrate the model’s value-added and illustrate the interaction between social identification, nationalism, state-building, and the power politics of interstate war.
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| 4 |
ID:
129078
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| 5 |
ID:
140005
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the deadline for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) approaches, the Philippines has yet to complete the implementation of its commitments in the AEC Blueprint. While it is true that the government has implemented most of them, these policy reforms have yet to make an impact on the economy. This paper examines the country’s performance in terms of its commitments in the AEC by identifying the gaps between those commitments and actual implementation. It also examines the domestic economic conflicts that have hampered Philippine policy reform efforts, focusing on the automobile industry. The conflicts may be due to a lack of common economic interests among firms in the industry as well as because of the lack of coherence of domestic policies that have limited, if not negated, progress towards economic integration. Domestic conflicts have created an industry that has failed to develop as a major exporter as well as a source of employment and income for the country.
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| 6 |
ID:
082405
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The assassination of a political leader is among the highest-profile acts of political violence, and conventional wisdom holds that such events often have substantial political, social, and economic effects on states. We investigate the extent to which the assassination of a head of state affects political stability through an analysis of all assassinations of heads of state between 1952 and 1997. We examine the political consequences of assassination by assessing the levels of political unrest, instability, and civil war in states that experience the assassination of their head of state. Our findings support the existence of an interactive relationship among assassination, leadership succession, and political turmoil: in particular, we find that assassinations' effects on political instability are greatest in systems in which the process of leadership succession is informal and unregulated
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| 7 |
ID:
107800
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study argues that environmental scarcity is more likely to result in civil conflict in countries that experience 'ethnic' population pressures (i.e. where the size of the largest minority group is close to parity with the majority group). I refer to this argument as the 'parity-threat' approach to the study of scarcity-induced domestic conflict. I empirically test my argument by analysing time-series cross-section data for the period 1979-2000 using four alternative environmental indicators: (1) ecological footprint, (2) biocapacity, (3) scarcity of ecological reserves and (4) water scarcity. The results demonstrate that environmental scarcity increases the probability of civil conflict when conditioned by 'ethnic' population pressures.
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| 8 |
ID:
067419
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