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| 1 |
ID:
125004
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a highly uneven track record, clear-hold-build has remained a dominant, even universal, approach to counterinsurgency. Its prevalence is rooted in its incontestable sequencing of operations and the attendant promise of a linear path towards peace. Yet the appeal of this approach also makes it deceptive and possibly dangerous. Clear-hold-build is not a strategy and must not be mistaken for one, as it has been in Afghanistan, where it inspired false hope for swift progress. Instead, it is necessary to reach a more problematized view of this approach and of what it aims to achieve. This article provides such an evaluation, proposing five principles that should guide its future application. These principles point to the need for a far deeper understanding of how security, development, and governance interact at the local level. Counterinsurgents must understand the relationships between aid and security, between government and governance, and between state and periphery. Where the central government is predatory or lacks support, clear-hold-build also raises difficult questions of authority, legitimacy, and control - questions that counterinsurgents must be capable of answering. Thus problematized, clear-hold-build emerges as a framework with heuristic utility; a schema that can be helpful in planning but which must at the time of application be populated by knowledge, substance, and skill. The implications of these requirements are troubling, particularly for those governments still in the business of armed intervention.
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| 2 |
ID:
080768
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the U.S. military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to "high-intensity" or "conventional" combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the U.S. military 'learning counterinsurgency'? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the U.S. campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fall-out from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the U.S. military
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| 3 |
ID:
067471
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