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| 1 |
ID:
067529
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2006.
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| Description |
xvii, 228p.
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| Series |
Asian security studies
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| Standard Number |
0415770033
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050551 | 355.30951/BLA 050551 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
092016
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2006.
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| Description |
xvii, 228p.
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| Standard Number |
9780415770033
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054449 | 355.30951/BLA 054449 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
093264
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2010.
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| Description |
xvii, 228p.
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| Standard Number |
9780415770033
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054659 | 355.30951/BLA 054659 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
148216
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.
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| 5 |
ID:
177818
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| Summary/Abstract |
After ‘below the neck’ reforms of operational units in 2017, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army remains the PLA’s largest service as China seeks to develop forces with increased joint capabilities in the maritime, air, and space/cyber domains. The Army is expanding its ‘new-type combat forces,’ such as Special Operations, helicopter, long-range rocket, and electronic warfare units, to contribute to maritime operations as well as to land missions. It has standardised the structure of group armies and formed new combined arms brigades and battalions. Reform has affected nearly every Army unit resulting in a short-term decline in large-scale training and operational readiness as newly organised units focus on individual and small unit functional training. Senior PLA leaders acknowledge numerous shortcomings in Chinese military capabilities and are cautious about initiating combat operations, preferring instead to achieve China’s objectives through deterrence or actions below the threshold of lethal military force.
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| 6 |
ID:
073495
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pentagon's 2006 report provides little credible new information to support its suppositions about China's lack of transparency, undeclared motivations, or 'military expansion.'"
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| 7 |
ID:
105080
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does 'doctrine drive technology' or does 'technology drive doctrine'? For the United States with its advanced industrial and technological base, many examples of 'doctrine driving technology' can be found. For the People's Liberation Army (PLA), however, most evidence from military sources indicates that 'technology drives doctrine' or, as the Chinese say, 'technology determines tactics' (but not necessarily strategy). Within an overarching Chinese strategic framework, tactics and doctrine will be developed appropriate for (a) the weapons and technologies that are actually in the Chinese armed forces and (b) the people who must operate and maintain them. The Chinese civilian and military leadership has designated 2049 for completion of the modernization of the Chinese armed forces, a date selected in conjunction with the target for achieving China's main strategic priority, national economic modernization. Barring a major change in the strategic or domestic environment, we can expect that Beijing will continue to pursue the development of new weapons and technology in a manner consistent with the larger goal of national economic development. Exactly how China fights in the future will be dependent upon the weapons and technologies available - and they will be employed within the parameters defined by active defense and People's War.
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