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ID:
107781
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| Publication |
London, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
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| Description |
xiii, 282p.
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| Standard Number |
9781405198455
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056293 | 327.73/NIB 056293 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
128579
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| 3 |
ID:
132996
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a world of flashpoints and European defence cuts the alliance needs strengthening, when the British government offered to host the NATO summit in Wales on September,4-5, few foresav that this would be a defining moment in the history of the Atlantic Alliance.
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| 4 |
ID:
078551
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Power in Britain has changed hands from a prime minister who sought to balance intense UK-US consultation on foreign policy with the ambition to be 'at the heart of Europe' to one whose approach towards both the United States and the European Union has yet to be tested. It is an appropriate moment, there fore, to assess how these two contextual poles of British foreign policy-making have changed over recent years and what this might mean for UK foreign policy choices. The premise of this article is that the days are now largely over when the UK can or should start out by trying to build an Anglo-US position on a foreign policy challenge before trying to tie in the European and transatlantic positions. The UK is now a central player in the development of increasingly activist European foreign policies, whether these can later be coordinated effectively with the United States or not. A strong, bilateral relationship continues to serve the interests of both sides on multiple levels, but this relationship does not sit upon the same foundations as during the Cold War. There are now significant underlying factors, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the US and July 7 2005 in the UK, that pull the US away from Europe and the UK, while pushing the UK towards Europe as the first port of call in developing foreign policy strategies. It is also notable that, today, UK positions on most global issues and foreign policy challenges tend to conform more closely to the dominant EU line than to the United States. On balance, the UK might think about European integration more from a US than from a European perspective, but it now thinks about global problems more from a European than from a US or transatlantic perspective
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| 5 |
ID:
067781
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| 6 |
ID:
083111
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
dominant facet of European hopes for the new administration is that it will play a leadership role in addressing some of the world's most intractable problems and conflicts rather than protecting its interests within a narrow definition of national security
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| 7 |
ID:
149628
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| Summary/Abstract |
The liberal international order [1] has always depended on the idea of progress. Since 1945, Western policymakers have believed that open markets, democracy, and individual human rights would gradually spread across the entire globe. Today, such hopes seem naive.
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ID:
163267
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A series of centenary anniversaries for some of the original think-tanks, as well as increasing turbulence in domestic and international affairs, makes this a propitious time to review the role of think-tanks in helping to build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. Today, western think-tanks, in particular, face a number of challenges to their relevance and credibility. It remains to be seen whether they can rediscover a sense of purpose that is fit for the twenty-first century, at a time when the pillars of the western-led international order that mobilized their counterparts early in the twentieth century are eroding. To do so, I propose five practical steps that all think-tanks can take to adapt to these demands and challenges. I also suggest a set of principles that both western think-tanks and their counterparts in other parts of the world should commit to if they want to work together to promote the sort of peaceful and cooperative world that lies at the core of their stated missions. At heart, leading think-tanks must consider whether it suffices to try to remain sources of objective debate and analysis, or if it is time, once again, for them to adopt a more proactive stance, being explicit about the principles that they believe should underpin peace and prosperity. If independent think-tanks work together around converging principles, then they can contribute to the emergence for the first time of an inclusive international society and thus confirm their normative as well as practical value.
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| 9 |
ID:
123150
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