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1 |
ID:
188333
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Summary/Abstract |
America's longest war ended unceremoniously in August 2021 amid chaotic scenes of Afghan civilians storming the Kabul airport in a desperate effort to board a flight out of the country. The twenty-year war took the lives of 2,448 U.S. service members, 1,144 allied service members, 66,000 Afghan military and police, 3,846 U.S. contractors, 444 aid workers, 72 journalists, and 47,245 Afghan civilians as well as 51,191 Taliban and other insurgents.1 It cost the United States an estimated $2 trillion, billions of it spent on an Afghan army that collapsed in a matter of weeks.2 By any measure the mission was an utter failure bought at a terrible price in blood and treasure. While the current public argument focuses on assigning political blame, a more serious discussion has already begun. Debate rests on a broad fundamental question: Did failure result from mistakes made at crucial junctures during the campaign, or was the war unwinnable at a cost the United States could bear?
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2 |
ID:
048041
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Publication |
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995.
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Description |
xvi, 165p.
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Series |
War, armed forces, and society
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Standard Number |
0719039193
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
042297 | 355.02180941/MOC 042297 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
083555
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Publication |
Westport, Praeger Security International, 2008.
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Description |
xii, 189p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9780275999476
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
053964 | 956.704434/MOC 053964 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
116259
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
No aspect of British counter-insurgency has been more problematic and controversial than the doctrine of minimum force. This common law principle provided ambiguous guidance for soldiers and police quelling unrest within a global empire and has become the subject of intense scholarly debate in the post-imperial era. The argument divides academics into two broad camps. One group sees minimum force as a vital element of a largely successful, uniquely British approach to counter-insurgency. The other claims that the legal principle never really restrained British security forces and considers the British approach to counter-insurgency neither unique nor particularly successful. This debate appeared in an exchange of views between John Newsinger and the current author in a 1990 volume of Small Wars and Insurgencies and more recently in a similar but lengthier argument between Rod Thornton and Huw Bennett in the same journal between 2007 and 2010.1
Such disagreements are of course endemic to academic discourse. This one, however, seems to be about more than history.
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5 |
ID:
077602
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Publication |
Westport, Praeger Security International, 2007.
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Description |
xiii, 158p.
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Standard Number |
9780275989637
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
052361 | 363.325/MOC 052361 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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6 |
ID:
047493
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Publication |
Westport, Praeger Publishers, 1999.
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Description |
xi, 166p.
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Standard Number |
0275961737
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
043431 | 341.584/MOC 043431 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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7 |
ID:
056234
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