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| 1 |
ID:
158219
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of 2012 a sizeable number of Belgian and Dutch young men and women have joined the armed conflict in Syria. According to recent estimates, there are 632 Belgian and 260 Dutch foreign fighters in Syria. Very little is known about the families these men and women come from. The research on which this article is based comprised ethnographic research among 26 families with at least one member who has left for Syria to join the armed struggle. In addition, former teachers of these youngsters were asked to reflect on their students' actions. The central question of this article is whether or not the families of youngsters who left for Syria played a supporting role in the departure decision and, therefore, the process of radicalization of the young men and women. To answer this question the families' perception of the armed struggle is described. Also discussed are signals of radicalization present prior to the youngsters' departure and actions taken by the families to prevent departure or alternatively facilitate their trip.
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| 2 |
ID:
124144
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nuclear decision-making is embedded in slowly evolving political, economic and financial institutions. Belgium houses extended nuclear activities, mostly under French control, for example: SUEZ-GDF and EDF own all Belgian nuclear power plants. But a 2003 law mandates the closure of Belgium's nuclear power plants at a service age of 40 years; only force majeure could lift the strict obligation. Opposition to the law argued with climate change danger, financial losses, and loss-of-load risks. The financial issue got interwoven with a fuzzy debate on the definition, height and appropriation of “nuclear rents”. As plausible hypothesis is adopted: the prospected transfer of hundreds millions of euro from power companies to the public interest will create public support for life extension. But the nuclear rents discussion had faded in July 2012 when the Belgian government admitted a 10-year life extension for TIHANGE I (962 MW) and imposed the closure of the 2×433 MW DOEL I and II. Loss-of-load risk was the government's only public argument. The opacity of the decision process and its “fifty-fifty” outcome do not allow proper testing of the hypothesis. The case illustrates that politicians cannot bind their followers except through the deployment of alternative power sources.
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| 3 |
ID:
153166
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Kingdom of Belgium has two intelligence services. The domestic State Security service, the Veiligheid van de Staat–Sûreté de l’Etat (VSSE), was established in 1830. A military intelligence service, the Algemene Dienst Inlichtingen en Veiligheid–Service Général du Renseignement et de la Securité (ADIV/SGRS–ACOS-IS1 Within the Belgian Defence flow chart, the service is known as ACOS-IS, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence and Security.
), was established in 1915 to provide intelligence for the military and act as a security service for the Belgian Army’s operations.
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| 4 |
ID:
173074
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| 5 |
ID:
068283
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| 6 |
ID:
138893
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since March 2013, the news has been dominated by young Muslims from European countries leaving for Syria to join the armed struggle against the Assad regime. This is especially remarkable in light of the fact that it would appear that, until very recently, European foreign fighters were far and few between. The armed struggle is a topic that is widely discussed among young Muslims on social media such as Facebook. During the research on which this article is based, I analyzed conversations between young Muslims on Facebook and also conducted interviews with a number of them. The key question was: Why is it that so many young people use social media to profess their willingness to sacrifice their lives in armed struggle while at the same time most of them are not prepared to turn their words into deeds? Despite all the media reports, the fact remains that of the large number of young Muslims who are potentially ready to go into battle, the vast majority prefer to stay at home for the time being. When I confronted the participants in these discussions with this inconsistency they offered a number of reasons as to why martyrdom was not yet granted to them. The way in which these considerations shape their lives and the role played by their religious convictions form the subject of this article.
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