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| 1 |
ID:
120906
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay reviews and analyzes Albania's connections with the Middle East since the era of Enver Hoxha's rule, when ideology was a strong factor in international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, Albania has been most interested in developing political, economic, and cultural ties, especially with Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region. Through its modern history, Albania has been a good example of a politically and economically weak state exercising a fairly consistent asymmetric foreign policy based on the support of great powers and their allies.
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| 2 |
ID:
168407
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| 3 |
ID:
181951
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| 4 |
ID:
068321
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| 5 |
ID:
156285
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This article will examine the interactions of Armenians and Jews as well as shared and dissimilar experiences in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey from the early 20th century to the present to compare how affinities and differences in political outlook have affected their relationship. It has been stated at times in academia, by politicians, and members of the press that the Armenian and Jewish Diasporas have had similar historical experiences mostly through hardships. Despite that being the case, this article will show that throughout their experiences as non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey Armenians and Jews have never developed any coordinated collaboration; instead, they have pursued perceived respective ethnic interests, largely influenced by historical memory and geopolitics. At the same time, the Young Turks and later the Turkish state engaged in policies, especially toward non-Muslim minorities, that have been described as contradictory, ambivalent, or both in nature, influenced by changing perceptions of citizenship and identity as well as geopolitics.
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| 6 |
ID:
178102
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| 7 |
ID:
172016
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South Sudan, composed originally of 10 states populated by more than 12 million inhabitants of numerous ethnicities and languages and practicing mostly an animist or Christian faith, received its independence from predominantly Arab and Sunni Muslim Sudan on July 9, 2011, becoming the fifty‐fourth sovereign country in Africa. Following decades of conflict and a referendum, it is only one of two political entities on the continent that has successfully seceded from another country and been universally recognized as a sovereign state (Eritrea being the other) since the period of European decolonization (Ghana in 1957 to Zimbabwe in 1980) and Namibia's independence from Apartheid South Africa in 1990.1 However, despite sizable oil deposits and other natural resources as well as fertile land, South Sudan's population suffers from a lack of education and health care as well as food shortages and extreme poverty.
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| 8 |
ID:
158829
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| 9 |
ID:
180315
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| Summary/Abstract |
During much of the past several decades, Moroccan actions in Western Sahara have impacted on that country’s bilateral and multilateral ties, especially with other countries in Africa, though to a lesser degree in the Arab world. In recent years, Morocco has gained the upper hand in its conflict in Western Sahara and has been increasing its political and economic footprint on the continent of Africa, an area of interest since independence. At the same time, Morocco has regarded itself as a “gateway” to Africa for the USA and Europe, while the USA, France (and the Gulf states) have provided military and financial assistance as well as diplomatic support for Morocco as that country’s policies have served Western interests. While attention is given by academics in recent years to the involvement in Africa of other middle powers from the Middle East such as Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia and, in the past, of Nasser’s Egypt and Qaddafi’s Libya, as well as Israel, Morocco has not stirred the same sort of interest. This article seeks to address that issue by examining all political and economic factors that have influenced Moroccan policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, those both connected and unconnected with the issue of the Western Sahara dispute.
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| 10 |
ID:
182864
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nigeria has the largest Muslim population and economy in terms of gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation among other political, economic, or cultural groupings. Thus, especially in good economic times, Nigeria has a great deal of influence not only on the continent of Africa, but also beyond that geographical region as a middle power. Domestically, Muslims constitute a slight majority in Nigeria’s population with almost all the remainder being Christian. Although Nigeria’s constitution prohibits an official religion, twelve of the country’s thirty-six states (located in the north) follow sharia, or Islamic law. Before Britain’s colonization in the nineteenth century, the northern regions of Nigeria constituted parts of two Sunni Muslim political entities, the Sokoto Caliphate and the Bornu Empire. Although Nigeria’s military and civilian presidents have sometimes acted on their own whims with regard to foreign policy toward the Middle East, in most cases Nigeria’s economic development and internal security have been their overriding concerns. This article addresses Nigeria’s relations with Muslim countries in the Middle East, among them Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, which are also middle powers. Nigeria, through a balanced approach, has been able to avoid getting involved in Middle Eastern regional squabbles and disputes, while at the same time benefiting from economic investment from countries in that region. Nevertheless, corruption and inefficiency have precluded any real benefit for the vast majority of Nigeria’s population from the revenues derived from the export of hydrocarbons. All the while the country has been affected adversely by the actions of both Sunni and Shi‘i indigenous jihadist groups, which have been inspired at least in part by developments in the Middle East.
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| 11 |
ID:
132035
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| 12 |
ID:
189574
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| 13 |
ID:
115331
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan became independent upon the breakup of the Soviet Union. Neither of these republics developed strong nationalist identities and it has been the task of their former communist leaders who are still in power to develop such identities while suppressing internal divisions. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have had a history of tolerance toward their respective Jewish populations, from which many have immigrated to Israel (and the United States) in recent years to unite with family or for economic reasons. Those republics view Israel Diaspora Jews as a source of investment and technological know-how as well as an avenue for better relations with the United States. Conversely, Israel, while considering Russian sensitivities in its relations with Central Asia, values the region as a market for Israeli products, a source for hydrocarbon resources and a way to counteract Iran as well as to seek a more favourable attitude in disputes with the Arabs.
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| 14 |
ID:
098675
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| 15 |
ID:
098720
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| 16 |
ID:
142162
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, three republics in the South Caucasus — Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan — achieved independence for the second time during the twentieth century (their first experience, following the Russian Revolution, had been contentious and short-lived). Located at the crossroads of Russia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the republics have depended for their political and economic security on the balancing of relations with both their regional neighbors and the major powers. Their foreign policy has been shaped by concerns over territorial integrity, ethnic brethren residing abroad, trade routes and historical memory.
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| 17 |
ID:
090124
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, three republics in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) achieved independence for the second time during the twentieth century. Their first experience was contentious and short-lived, had little or no support from the Western powers and was brought to end by the newly formed Soviet Union with the tacit approval of Turkey. While Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani national aspirations were quashed in the early post-First World War era, Zionism was given encouragement with the establishment of the Palestine Mandate. When Israel was established it was given immediate recognition by the Soviet Union, but most Jews from Georgia and Azerbaijan - Armenia's population was very small in comparison - only made their way to Israel during the last years of the Cold War. On the other hand, following the Second World War, some members of the Armenian Diaspora, including those in the Arab world, immigrated to the Soviet Union. While Soviet-Israeli relations had been strained since the Six-Day War, the end of the Cold War not only brought better ties between Russia and Israel, but it allowed Israel to establish relations with the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Many of those countries sought ties with Israel (and the other Western states) to insure their continued independence from Russia, while, at the same time, Arab-Israeli relations improved and Turkey and Israel drew closer together. Iran was regarded with suspicion by Azerbaijan and along with Georgia, which wanted to enhance its ties with the West, drew closer to Turkey. Both countries have benefited from the transport of oil. Jews from Georgia and Azerbaijan have kept close connections with their former countries, where anti-Semitism was never the problem it was in Russia. Armenia has remained the closest to Russia with its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh and its distrust of Georgia. However, Armenians experienced genocide at the hands of the Ottomans and have sought support from Israel over that issue.
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| 18 |
ID:
174146
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sri Lanka is a small country with limited resources. Historically, its politics have been dominated by a Sinhalese/Buddhist majority. Non-alignment has been viewed as a matter of principle in foreign policy and as a means to provide for Sri Lanka’s political and economic security. Sri Lanka has had to balance its relations with the major powers and its immediate neighbours as well as Israel and its Arab and Muslim neighbours. The last relationship has been the most difficult to navigate and, at times, has had the appearance of expediency rather than consistency. Somehow, Sri Lanka has been able to navigate its way quite effectively in foreign relations, while domestic affairs have been another matter. While there are numerous studies on India’s and Pakistan’s relations with countries in the Middle East, Sri Lanka’s ties to the region have received little or no attention by scholars. This article intends to remedy the situation with a comprehensive historical examination.
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| 19 |
ID:
187430
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| Summary/Abstract |
This is an examination of the historical background and demographic composition of minorities in the three South Caucasus states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—as well as a survey of their current status and limits to aspirations of those ethnic groups. It utilizes Sammy Smooha’s concept of ethnic democracy: “a system in which two contradictory principles operate: ‘the democratic principle,’ making for equal rights and equal treatment of all citizens, and ‘the ethnic principle,’ making for fashioning a homogenous nation-state and privileging the ethnic majority.” All of the countries examined fit that category in principle given their respective Constitutions, but Azerbaijan unlike its two neighbors has an autocratic system of government eliminating itself in terms of practice. Armenia is the most homogenous of the three states, while Georgia has the most diverse population. Yet all have numerous minorities living within their borders as well as having ethnic brethren in neighboring countries; dealing with those groups has been problematic to various degrees. Georgia has lost territory—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—to secessionist minorities aided by Russia, while Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in war over Nagorno-Karabakh, while driving out of their respective countries either Azerbaijanis or Armenians.
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| 20 |
ID:
174378
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| Summary/Abstract |
This is an examination of political, military, economic and cultural relations between Turkey and Afghanistan since 1919. While cultural connections, Turkish security and technical assistance, and bilateral trade have been emphasized throughout this relationship, the closest ties were during the leadership of Turkey’s Kemal Atatürk and the reign of Afghanistan’s King Amanullah when modernization reforms were in vogue in both countries, and more recently since 2002 during the rule of Turkey’s Islam-oriented Justice and Development (AK) Party, which developed an affinity with the leaders of Afghanistan’s Islamic Republic, but kept open connections with the rival Taliban. Both countries included neighboring Iran in their plans for counteracting aggressive moves by the European powers involved in the Middle East, central and south Asia. Since the Second World War, Turkey has been a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while except for the Marxist period (1978–1992), Afghanistan has preferred nonalignment. However, it has been Turkey’s connection with NATO that has facilitated close ties with Afghanistan.
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