Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
075553
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Publication |
New Jersey, World Scientific, 2006.
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Description |
xviii, 289p.
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Series |
Economic Development and Growth Vol 1
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Standard Number |
9812568557
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
052055 | 330.951/YAO 052055 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
134860
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Summary/Abstract |
Using a sample of 1185 households in 48 Chinese villages for the period 1987–2002, we study the effects of major health shocks on household income and the role played by village elections in mitigating these effects. Major health shocks are defined by abnormal increases in a household's medical expenditure. Our results show that a major health shock reduces households' net income significantly and that village elections alleviate such adverse impacts by almost half. The main mechanism behind this effect is increased coverage of health care insurance, which helps households smooth their consumption when major health shocks happen.
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3 |
ID:
068390
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4 |
ID:
096235
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper evaluates the impact of privatization on firm employment using a panel dataset of 386 firms in China in the period 1995-2001. Our panel regressions find that employment drops more slowly in privatized firms than in pure state-owned firms by a margin of 17.7 percentage points over the base year of 1995. We also study the dynamic impacts of privatization on employment growth and find that the performance of privatized firms improves over time. Using the difference-in-difference propensity score matching method, we arrive at similar results. To test the robustness of our conclusions, we use alternative definitions of privatization and find that the impacts of privatization on employment are independent of the definition of privatization. These findings are robust even after we control other performance and financial variables as well as the pre-privatization employment history of privatized firms.
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5 |
ID:
140178
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Summary/Abstract |
Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.
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6 |
ID:
147502
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Summary/Abstract |
Following the 1973 oil crisis, Japan's economic growth slowed down substantially and its asset prices overshot their long-term trend. The economic performance of this episode of the Japanese history has been dubbed the “Japan syndrome.” China has followed Japan's export-led growth model and the current world economy very much resembles the world economy following the oil crisis. It is then a legitimate question to ask whether China is likely to follow in Japan's steps and experience a major slowdown in its growth. The present paper shows that China can do a better job than Japan primarily because its large size allows the country to benefit from internal convergence. Based on the estimation of a growth equation using cross-country panel data, the paper forecasts that under reasonable assumptions about the growth rate of the world economy and China's investment rate, China could maintain reasonably high growth rates in the next 10 years.
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