|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
068680
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
157598
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
On 1 July 2011, a free trade agreement was provisionally implemented between the EU and South Korea. At the time, there were clear expectations within the EU business community in Seoul about the likely impact of the deal, including an increase in EU exports, the dismantling of tariff and existing non-tariff barriers (NTBs), the possible emergence of new NTBs, the further development of mechanisms for discussion and problem-solving mechanisms, and a shift in Koreans’ perceptions of all imported EU goods as luxury items. Interviews conducted with expatriate executives, diplomats and trade officials in Seoul in 2015 revealed the extent to which these expectations have been fulfilled and also highlighted the importance of broad economic and social trends in the strong performance of EU exports since 2011. These included the maturing of the Korean economy and the growing need for high-end industrial goods, and the Koreans’ increasing purchasing power and the concomitant desire to engage in displays of wealth. In addition to contributing to the general academic debate on the impact of free trade agreements (FTAs) and adding specific colour to the case of the EU-Korea FTA, this research will play an important role in shaping responses to the shifting economic, social and cultural trends that will impact the future outcomes of this key trade deal between the EU and Korea. It will also inform the EC’s discussions with current and future free trade agreement partners and its analysis of the various factors influencing the actual and perceived success or failure of those deals.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
074218
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes Korean attitudes towards inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) before and after the 1997 financial crisis, within the context of the debate on the costs and benefits of IFDI and intensifying global competition to attract inward investment. The Korean experience sheds light on the forces driving the liberalization and deregulation of inward investment by countries that had previously restricted and controlled IFDI and on the problems inherent in implementing these policy changes. For more than three decades, the South Korean government maintained a negative or passive attitude towards inward investment, which, despite its potential economic benefits, was seen as a less desirable option than using foreign loans to finance economic development. However, the 1997 crisis brought about a fundamental change in the Korean government's attitude, and led to sweeping policy changes that resulted in an investment boom in the immediate post-crisis period. After this initial success, the subsequent decline in FDI inflows prompted further measures to attract high-quality foreign investment. As the Korean government has discovered, while legal frameworks, promotional systems and structures can be reformed with relative ease, the issue of changing investors' perceptions of Korea and the Koreans' views of the role and value of inward investment is more problematic. Failure to resolve these problems and to develop strong locational advantages will put Korea at risk of losing crucial investments to regional competitors and will undermine efforts to enhance the global competitiveness of Korean firms and to promote sustainable economic growth and development in the years ahead.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
114222
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Group of 20 summit of developed and developing countries-the self-appointed "premier forum for international economic cooperation"-met in the South Korean capital in November 2010. This was a watershed event in that it was the first time for the G-20 to meet in an Asian, non-G8 country. This article evaluates the success of the Seoul summit against a range of criteria and from various perspectives, in addition to commenting on the appropriateness of these criteria in measuring the performance of future summits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
123147
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In October 2010, the European Union (EU) and the Republic of Korea signed a free trade agreement that went into effect in July 2011 and aims to increase levels of bilateral trade and investment by dismantling existing tariff and non-tariff barriers. In this article, we highlight the importance of a third class of barriers: social, cultural and institutional barriers to trade with and investment in Korea that cannot be legislated for under the new agreement but that can serve as 'hidden stumbling blocks' to its implementation and effectiveness. We argue that the phenomenon of 'mismatched globalization' (in which economic globalization outpaces cultural globalization) is still apparent in Korea, as evidenced by the continuing existence of these 'soft' barriers which include, inter alia, the gap between policy and implementation; the lack of predictability, consistency and transparency in the regulatory environment (including IPR protection); education systems; labour militancy; and attitudes towards globalization. These findings resonate with Dent's (2006) argument that 'deficient capacity' in terms of technocracy, industry and/or institutional arrangements can pose problems for developing countries seeking to negotiate and implement bilateral trade agreements with more developed countries. In the case of Korea, the long-term 'soft' social, cultural and institutional barriers identified and discussed in this article act as a constraint on the country's institutional capacity functions and thus have the potential to hinder the full and effective implementation of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement and reduce the economic benefits that the signatory parties hope to gain from it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|