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ID:
096706
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| 2 |
ID:
096509
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| 3 |
ID:
068184
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2005.
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| Description |
xxvi, 211p.
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| Standard Number |
0415385946
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050993 | 303.625/BUN 050993 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
152966
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| Summary/Abstract |
Insurgencies have proven to be highly adaptive movements that exploit their environments and change and mutate in order to survive. States and international actors have long grappled with ways to thwart such adaptations. In this respect, disengagement initiatives that offer insurgents opportunities for alternative livelihood seem to present a viable mechanism for weakening insurgencies. Analyzing the case of the North Caucasus insurgency, this article examines the interrelation between such variables as insurgent crises, government disengagement programs, and foreign attempts to co-opt the insurgency. It is argued that disengagement programs implemented during the second Chechen conflict prevented the insurgent command from pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda because insurgents had to preserve their local orientation to compete for their bases of support. In 2014, however, the North Caucasus insurgents pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as no viable disengagement opportunities existed at the time and their only route for survival was to join a global insurgency.
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| 5 |
ID:
085480
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper looks at the virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. It argues that the West is faltering in the 'War of Ideas' with global Jihad for the main reason that the messages that we wish to convey lack narrative coherence. This is a result of the fact that we misapprehend the nature of the virtual operational environment whereas our opponents possess an intuitive grasp of it as a result of which their structure and method of operations are better adapted and more effective than our own. There is no reason, beyond inertia, that this should remain the case.
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