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| 1 |
ID:
102429
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article draws on fresh archival research to challenge Robert Putnam's 'Two Level Game Theory'. In his seminal article, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games', published by International Organization in 1988, Putnam contended that international negotiations proceed at the domestic level and at the international level. In taking diplomatic initiatives forward, leaders are compelled to respond to the needs of domestic constituencies, through granting concessions and building coalitions, while international negotiations are pursued with one goal in mind: that any agreement will not damage the domestic political calculus. This article contends that Lyndon Johnson's actions in 1968 disprove this thesis. The President was in fact relaxed about a Richard Nixon victory in the general election as his commitment to defend South Vietnam from communism was stronger than that of his sitting Vice President, Hubert Humphrey. The President's concern for the fate of South Vietnam thus superseded his concern for his 'normal supporters'- the Democratic Party at large - who had become so hostile towards his management of the Vietnam War.
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| 2 |
ID:
027260
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| Edition |
rev. ed.
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| Publication |
Boston, Beacon press, 1972.
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| Description |
xxi, 289p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0807002488
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 010834 | 959.704348/LIT 010834 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
146212
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| Summary/Abstract |
When North Vietnam launched a military offensive in March 1975, there was little expectation that South Vietnam would collapse 55 days later. As the South’s forces quickly crumbled and the scale of the military disaster became increasingly apparent, the United States considered a number of options to provide emergency assistance to its ally. This article will examine the evolution of the diplomatic, economic, military, and covert options US policymakers developed to support the South during the Final Offensive. These policy options will be set against the backdrop of the ‘scripts’ US officials devised to justify emergency assistance, as well as their delusions about the South’s prospects for survival.
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| 4 |
ID:
101887
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cost distribution theory suggests that the costs to the median voter in a democracy of fighting an insurgency with firepower are relatively low compared to a more labor-intensive approach. Therefore, this voter will favor a capitalintensive counterinsurgency campaign despite the resulting diminished prospects of victory. Primary and secondary sources show that President Lyndon Johnson and his civilian aides were very much aware that, although they considered a main force-focused and firepower-intensive strategy to be largely ineffective against the insurgency in South Vietnam, it was politically more popular in the United States. Importantly, civil-military agreement on warfighting strategy does not undermine this explanation, which assumes that civilian leaders, and ultimately the public, play an essential role in that strategy's determination. Appointing and supporting Gen. William Westmoreland was just one means by which the Johnson administration ensured that the U.S. military emphasized the fight against conventional enemy units and relied on the use of firepower for the fight against Vietcong insurgents. Civil-military disagreements over strategy, however rare, therefore provide the essential test of cost distribution theory's explanatory power. When officials suggested that the U.S. military adopt more labor-intensive pacification approaches to fight the insurgency, the Johnson administration rejected them.
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| 5 |
ID:
152027
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Foreign policy program transfer, the shifting of implementation responsibility for a foreign policy program from one organization to another, is a ubiquitous, yet under-studied, counterinsurgency phenomenon. This article conceptually develops program transfer as an important object of study; analyzes, using archival sources, an empirical case of program transfer, Operation Switchback, drawn from US counterinsurgency practice in South Vietnam; and formulates two preliminary theoretical claims related to program transfer: (1) transferred programs will tend to be altered in accordance with the characteristics of the gaining organization, and (2) program transfer may act as a signal or early-warning indicator of foreign policy change.
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| 6 |
ID:
155433
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper explores South Vietnamese efforts to draw on the lessons of the Taiwan and Korean “developmental states” and to employ these lessons in Saigon’s modernization efforts. It argues that development, shaped by debates about Taiwan and Korea, played an important role in the outcome of the war.
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| 7 |
ID:
105652
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When former US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, said of the US, 'We are a player in the Pakistani political system', she was pointing out how challenging it is to achieve US policy goals under the kinds of volatile political conditions engulfing that country. In late 2007, the Bush administration was banking on the political future of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who had recently returned to Pakistan, and was still providing President Pervez Musharraf with the substantial aid and support it had been giving him since 9/11. And yet by early 2008, Benazir Bhutto was dead, assassinated as she rose from her car to greet crowds of supporters, and Pervez Musharraf was a political liability, since his party had suffered a resounding defeat in the February 2008 election. These events demonstrated that even the foreign policies of a country as powerful as the US can be scuttled by the flux and flow of local power politics.
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| 8 |
ID:
110934
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This is an account of the origins and history of the little-known British Advisory Mission in Vietnam (BRIAM), which sought to transfer to Vietnam the techniques used in the Malayan Emergency to isolate insurgents from the population at large, while at the same time winning the loyalty of that population. This article looks first at the situation in South Vietnam and second at how the US and the UK viewed that situation and what they were doing about it. The third section deals with what BRIAM itself tried to do in introducing the process labelled "strategic hamlets". The final section seeks to explain why the process failed.
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| 9 |
ID:
128426
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We were sitting in a cafe on the Left Bank in Paris in November 1978 when the news broke that two thousand five hundred and sixty-four Vietnamese were stranded off the coast of Malaysia on a rusty cargo ship, the Hai Hong. They had fled Vietnam in a desperate attempt to seek freedom and asylum overseas. After sixteen days on the South China seas, buffeted by storms, crushed by the heat, with no more food or water, they had arrived on the shores of Indonesia, then Malaysia, only to be pushed back by the coast guards. They had nowhere to land, and the ship could go no further. Stranded and helpless, starving and totally dehydrated, they were dying before our eyes as they unfurled a makeshift banner in English across the side of the ship: "UN please save us."
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| 10 |
ID:
032923
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| Publication |
Saigan, American Embassy, 1972.
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| Description |
61p.pbk
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| Series |
Vietnam ; Documents and Research notes, no; 101
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| Contents |
Part III: First Nine month of the PRG
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 009325 | 959.7043/VIE 009325 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
124273
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay considers the importance of looking at writings for children for historical analysis, particularly in times of war, focusing on magazines published for youth in South Vietnam in the early 1970s. Two magazines, Thi?u Nhi and Th?ng B?m, in particular, are studied in terms of their editorial aims and contents, as well as their young readers' submissions in response to contemporary sociocultural issues raised in these magazines. The lively discussions in these magazines were made possible by the relative freedom of expression in South Vietnam, compared to North Vietnam, which was an important reason for the civil war being fought. Yet this freedom also challenged the fabric of Vietnamese society. The strongest concern of these magazines' initiators, editors and writers was that its readers not lose their sense of being Vietnamese in the face of the great wartime flood of American popular culture that captivated many youth. Anxiety that the younger generation would be Americanised and lose their identity struck at the core of what the war was being fought about: i.e. different versions of being Vietnamese in the modern world. This threat of Americanisation to fundamental Vietnamese values was perceived by some intellectuals in the South as more serious than the threat of communism, because at least the communists were Vietnamese.
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| 12 |
ID:
069156
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| 13 |
ID:
142713
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have portrayed the 1963 ‘Buddhist crisis’ in South Vietnam as a struggle for religious freedom, as a political conspiracy, or as a manifestation of ancient religious beliefs and practices. This paper, in contrast, argues that the crisis emerged from a clash of modernizing visions. The Buddhist-led protests that took place in South Vietnam in 1963 were linked to the Vietnamese Buddhist revival, a nationalist reform movement that began during the early twentieth century. The protests also reflected growing Buddhist anxieties about the Ngo Dinh Diem government's nation-building agenda for South Vietnam. By the time the crisis began, Buddhist leaders had concluded that this agenda (which Diem referred to as the ‘Personalist Revolution’) was incompatible with their plans to realize Vietnam's destiny as a ‘Buddhist nation’. In addition to reinterpreting the origins of the crisis, this paper examines how the course of events was shaped by the personalities and agendas of particular Buddhist and government leaders, and especially by fierce rivalries among members of Diem's family. These internal tensions help to explain the failure of attempts to end the crisis through negotiations, as well as Diem's decision to crush the movement by force in August 1963.
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| 14 |
ID:
159678
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines South Vietnam’s global diplomacy after constitutional government was restored in 1967. Far from an American puppet, the Saigon government showed considerable initiative spanning the globe for prospective allies. But its bid for international legitimacy ended in failure, with increased global exposure only underscoring its collapsing domestic support.
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| 15 |
ID:
074510
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| 16 |
ID:
154491
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The First Australian Task Force’s operations in South Vietnam were based on the British Commonwealth concept of counter-revolutionary warfare. Andrew T Ross shows how this strategy allowed the Task Force to suffer fewer casualties and achieve greater success than its US ally. Although this could not have changed the course of the war, it shows the viability of British Commonwealth counterinsurgency doctrine.
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| 17 |
ID:
145366
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| Summary/Abstract |
The expansive South China Sea covering an area of more than 3.5 million square kilometres consists of atolls, reefs, and small islands, only one of which has fresh water to support human habitation, has drawn considerable strategic and media attention in recent times. The Spratlys and the Paracels in particular are two of such islands, which China calls Nansha and Xisha islands, have shot into lime light in recent years and has all the potential to trigger a conflict, which can destabilise the region primarily for the geo-strategic reasons. China occupied the Paracels in 1974 from South Vietnam.
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| 18 |
ID:
027057
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Eurasia Publishing House(Pvt) Ltd, 1966.
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| Description |
xx, 490p.hbk
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| Series |
Studies in International Communism
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 004762 | 959.7043322/PIK 004762 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
140777
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Schenkman Publishing company, 1969.
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| Description |
viii, 213p.pbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 008659 | 959.704/ISA 008659 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 20 |
ID:
041457
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
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| Description |
56p.pbk
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| Series |
Document no; 101
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 009326 | 959.7/SAI 009326 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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