|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
173666
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
It was a typical Saturday night at the posh Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. The hotel’s coffee shop and adjacent dining room were teeming with oligarchs, businessmen, military officers, government functionaries, and expats, sitting in separate parties, eating dinner, and carrying on conversations about the country’s unfolding political turmoil. It was January 3, 1981, roughly a year into in El Salvador’s bloody civil war. At one table sat José Rodolfo Viera, a campesino turned head of the government’s agrarian reform agency. He was accompanied by two foreign advisors from the United States—Michael Hammer and Mark David Pearlman. Around 11pm, as Viera, Hammer, and Pearlman discussed agrarian reform over coffee, they were unexpectedly approached by two strangers in windbreakers. The strangers suddenly pulled submachine guns out from beneath their jackets and opened fire. All three men were killed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
141963
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
From 1979 until 1992, the United States government intervened in the Salvadoran Civil War to defeat ‘communist revolution,’ establish a moderate, centrist government, and prevent its overthrow. One of the primary means to accomplish American goals in El Salvador rested on a thorough application of counter-insurgency. In particular, American and Salvadoran strategists used civic action programmes to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Salvadorans and gain their allegiance. In 1983, whilst the war was at its zenith, the Salvadoran military launched an important counter-insurgency effort that attempted to reverse the government’s fortunes. Unfortunately, these plans failed to affect decisively the outcome of the conflict. Regardless, given their failure in the largest American intervention in the post-Vietnam era, they continue to remain a fundamental aspect of American counter-insurgency doctrine.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
133220
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
THE RECENT LITERATURE ON CIVIL WARS IS WIDE and deep; a number of major studies compel us to rethink what we know about this important subject. One of the areas that has eluded concerted scholarly attention has been the question of how national armies can be developed that satisfy the imperatives of post-civil war reconciliation and democratic consolidation. This issue is at the center of this article.
Civil wars are fought for different reasons in very different settings and are resolved differently. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw valuable lessons of building national armies from even highly disparate attempts in very different post-civil war environments. The principal goal of this article is to highlight, through their contrasting achievements and shortcomings, lessons we can learn from three cases.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
081532
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Massive emigration and transnational realities affect postwar El Salvador. While the civil war (1980-1992) displaced vast numbers of people, the steady flow of citizens out of national territory continues today. As emigrants who remain connected to El Salvador demonstrate their increased economic and political capital, the government of El Salvador, elites, and media respond by re-shaping ideas about the nation and national belonging. This article describes how emigrants and their descendants are being administratively and symbolically re-incorporated into the postwar national imagination. "Symbolic politics" is how scholars describe sending-state practices to strengthen emigrant ties to the original homeland. Typically, the reference is to practices that export fixed ideas about the nation and national identity. This essay shows instead how emigration affects "symbolic politics" by transforming the very idea of the nation, its people, and its boundaries. Further, I posit that new state, media, and elite practices contribute to the simultaneity of incorporation that influences transnational belonging
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
101785
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
129036
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
128228
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Following two frustrating counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a drive to find new and more viable ways of addressing irregular security challenges. In this effort, the 1980s' campaign in El Salvador has gained prominence, as it resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla adversary yet involved only a modest deployment of US personnel and resources. The use of history to search for models and precedents can be fruitful, but past conflicts must be understood on their own terms and not made to fit the preconceived ideas of the day. A deeper appreciation of what happened in El Salvador reveals not only the unique circumstances that shaped the campaign but also the limited results of the counterinsurgency program to which the war's outcome is now being ascribed. This article adopts a broader lens, focusing on the real yet undervalued factors that produced peace in El Salvador and whether the final outcome was truly quite as successful as is now commonly assumed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
094748
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Contemporary U.S. policy makers often characterize the U.S. counterinsurgency experience in El Salvador as a successful model to be followed in other contexts. This article argues that these characterizations significantly overstate the positive lessons of El Salvador, and ignore important cautionary implications. During the first part of the conflict, neither the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) nor the U.S. followed the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. The FAES killed tens of thousands of non-combatants in 1979 and 1980, before the civil war even began. This repression may have preempted an incipient popular insurrection, but it also locked in a determined social base that enabled the armed left to build a highly effective and sustained insurgency. In 1984, the U.S. had to save the FAES from likely defeat through a major increase in military aid, especially airpower. When the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) switched to a classical guerrilla strategy, the FAES, despite considerable U.S. aid, seldom followed best practices in counterinsurgency. Democratization and redistributional reforms were partial and flawed in implementation. The war settled into a stalemate that would likely have continued indefinitely had it not been for the collapse of the socialist bloc and significant changes in the interests of Salvadoran elites that were largely incidental to U.S. policies.The most important cautionary lesson is that indiscriminate violence against civilians early in a conflict can create dynamics that are very difficult to overcome in subsequent stages.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
007429
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Autumn 1994.
|
| Description |
290-300
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
069161
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
059790
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
153632
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Debates over how governments can defeat insurgencies ebb and flow with international events, becoming particularly contentious when the United States encounters problems in its efforts to support a counterinsurgent government. Often the United States confronts these problems as a zero-sum game in which the government and the insurgents compete for popular support and cooperation. The U.S. prescription for success has had two main elements: to support liberalizing, democratizing reforms to reduce popular grievances; and to pursue a military strategy that carefully targets insurgents while avoiding harming civilians. An analysis of contemporaneous documents and interviews with participants in three cases held up as models of the governance approach—Malaya, Dhofar, and El Salvador—shows that counterinsurgency success is the result of a violent process of state building in which elites contest for power, popular interests matter little, and the government benefits from uses of force against civilians.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
017172
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Winter 1994.
|
| Description |
83-98
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
147047
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After a decade and a half of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers want to change their approach to COIN by providing aid and advice to local governments rather than directly intervening with U.S. forces. Both this strategy and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in general, however, do not acknowledge the difficulty of convincing clients to follow U.S. COIN prescriptions. The historical record suggests that, despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the United States and its local partners have had significantly different goals, priorities, and interests with respect to the conduct of their counterinsurgency campaigns. Consequently, a key focus of attention in any future counterinsurgency assistance effort should be on shaping the client state's strategy and behavior. Although it is tempting to think that providing significant amounts of aid will generate the leverage necessary to affect a client's behavior and policies, the U.S. experience in assisting the government of El Salvador in that country's twelve-year civil war demonstrates that influence is more likely to flow from tight conditions on aid than from boundless generosity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
117468
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Analyzes government efforts to attract collective remittances for development. Building on insights from the literature on collective action and illustrating with the cases of Mexico and El Salvador, he concludes that leadership incentives, positive inducements in the form of private good, and certain trust-enhancing rules play a key role in the success of government-migrant partnerships.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
056413
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
140237
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
We suggest the value of considering Pacific Latin America and the South Pacific in relationship to each other in contexts of climate change and investment in extractive industry. The paper explores the interactions between extractive industry, climate change and environmental governance through the lenses of double exposure, double movements, resilience and risk. The first part of the paper addresses the nature and scope of investments in extractive industries in this ‘other Pacific’. The geography of these investments is changing the actual and perceived distribution of exposure and risk in the region. The nature of this risk is also being affected by climate change and its implications for the geographies of water and land-use. Much of the contention surrounding extractive industries can be understood as conflicts over the unequal distribution of this risk, how to interpret its significance and the ways in which resilience might be enhanced to respond to it. The final section of the paper discusses the ways in which mining governance and governance for resilience converge and, on the basis of recent experiences in El Salvador, analyses the difficulties in governing extractive industry in a way that manages risk and builds resilience.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
089215
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
During the 2004 presidential election campaign, Vice President Richard Cheney called for the Salvador option in Iraq, implying the training of local paramilitary and police forces to pacify the insurgency and restore public order.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
064040
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
099852
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
By contrasting the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, this paper argues that although the structural constraints against regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia and Central America during the 1980s were similar, the states in the two regions achieved varying success in overcoming two major structural constraints: the influence of global/regional actors and internal disunity. In particular, it focuses on how the political will and diplomatic skills of Indonesia and Mexico led to their different levels of contribution to the peace processes and their respective achievements. Through this, this paper intends to re-examine a core assumption of neorealism, that is, that structural constraints have a determinant influence on actors' behaviour.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|