| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
045466
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| Publication |
New York, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1983.
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| Description |
172p
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 024577 | 629.1/AER 024577 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
144509
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| 3 |
ID:
074440
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| 4 |
ID:
069535
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2002.
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| Description |
xxxv, 215p.
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| Standard Number |
0833031937
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046184 | 338.476291/LOR 046184 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
090391
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
I demonstrate the existence of two sources of contestability in the military aerospace market, within producing and export countries, through the State's triple role as unique buyer, regulator and seller. For the producing countries, I introduce the new concept, 'sovereignty price'; that is, the profit a State agrees to grant to its defence firms to perpetuate their domestic activities. This subjective, evolutionary concept provides a dynamic character to the theory of contestable markets. Moreover, I show that contestability is more effective than antitrust policies and a solution of the cost disease. Empirical cases are shown to confirm the theoretical analysis.
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