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ID:
069891
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Secessionist groups, if they are to achieve their goal of independence, require both domestic and international support, although neither is easy to obtain. One strategy that such groups may pursue is the use of their identity to gain support both at home and abroad. What causes leaders of a secessionist movement to focus on one identity over another and why do these identities change over time? How much flexibility do elites have in making these choices? This article explores the ways in which latent identities simultaneously constrain and empower secessionist groups in achieving their political ambitions. We argue that the leaders of such groups engage in "identity layering" to achieve statehood for their region. Two cases, the Eritrean and Macedonian secessionist movements, are used to illustrate both the logic of identity layering and the dilemmas it entails. The central argument is that the configuration of constraints in each case largely determines the identities that are selected and layered onto the group in question. The use of such identities may also generate resistance-from within the secessionist entity or from outside-which in turn creates incentives for identity change. This analysis shows, first, that territorial identities (as opposed to ethnic or ideological ones) tend to serve as the group's primary mobilizational base, and second, that domestic imperatives weigh more heavily than international pressures in determining the success of these choices.
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| 2 |
ID:
069893
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a scholarly consensus that hegemony is exercised primarily through the use of coercion and positive inducements, scholars of international relations have devoted little attention to how dominant states choose between these influence tools to impose their desired international order on weak but recalcitrant states. This article presents an analytical framework to examine the determinants of such choices. In doing so, it develops three alternative theoretical models of international order enforcement from extant international relations literature and offers a preliminary assessment of their relative merits by way of a comparative study of two cases drawn from the nineteenth-century Pax Britannica. This plausibility probe shows that social conventions can play an important role in the choice of enforcement strategies and that neither realist nor domestic-politics explanations offer useful general models of the enforcement of international order.
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| 3 |
ID:
069892
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting.
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| 4 |
ID:
069890
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The pattern of cooperative behavior seen in the Concert of Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century resulted from a commitment to uphold the settlement, which hinged on the credibility of enforcement threats and a distribution of benefits commensurate with military capabilities. The equilibrium was self-enforcing because the powers that could oppose an alteration of the system had incentives to do so, and the powers that could upset it did not have incentives to do so. This behavior is markedly different from eighteenth-century practices, although no change in state preferences is necessary to explain the change in behavior
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