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| 1 |
ID:
101342
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article evaluates the record of minority return in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo to assess the viability of ethnic reintegration in the wake of protracted sectarian violence. Comparative analysis reveals that the logic of post-war ethnic spoils has greatly limited the success of such programmes. What success has been achieved is largely due to third party efforts to disrupt patronage networks and challenge post-war authorities. I conclude that these factors are more significant barriers to reintegration than inexorable ethnic hatreds and fears derived from memories of war. Because such barriers are more readily overcome than entrenched grassroots hostilities, there may be more hope for reintegration than previously thought. However, the systematic failure of the international community to protect and assist prospective minority returnees suggests that continued scepticism of post-war reintegration is in order.
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| 2 |
ID:
175434
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Major powers have long used cultural institutes to enhance their appeal in foreign countries. As aspirant powers, Russia and China have recently launched cultural institutes of their own with the aim of improving their international reputations. However, the location and operations of the Confucius Institutes and Russkiy Mir Institutes often seem to run counter to these aims. Drawing on policy diffusion theory (PDT), we argue that these choices are less the product of strategic calculation than of policy emulation and decoupling. Using a mixed methods approach, we show that, while the Confucius Institutes and Russkiy Mir Institutes were modelled after their Western counterparts (emulation), China and Russia have operated their institutes in ways that go against the principles of cultural diplomacy (decoupling). An analysis of field research on these institutes suggests more overall decoupling with Confucius Institutes than with Russkiy Mir Institutes, which might help account for the relatively greater backlash against the Confucius Institutes in their host countries.
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| 3 |
ID:
069891
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2005.
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Secessionist groups, if they are to achieve their goal of independence, require both domestic and international support, although neither is easy to obtain. One strategy that such groups may pursue is the use of their identity to gain support both at home and abroad. What causes leaders of a secessionist movement to focus on one identity over another and why do these identities change over time? How much flexibility do elites have in making these choices? This article explores the ways in which latent identities simultaneously constrain and empower secessionist groups in achieving their political ambitions. We argue that the leaders of such groups engage in "identity layering" to achieve statehood for their region. Two cases, the Eritrean and Macedonian secessionist movements, are used to illustrate both the logic of identity layering and the dilemmas it entails. The central argument is that the configuration of constraints in each case largely determines the identities that are selected and layered onto the group in question. The use of such identities may also generate resistance-from within the secessionist entity or from outside-which in turn creates incentives for identity change. This analysis shows, first, that territorial identities (as opposed to ethnic or ideological ones) tend to serve as the group's primary mobilizational base, and second, that domestic imperatives weigh more heavily than international pressures in determining the success of these choices.
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| 4 |
ID:
134797
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much ink has been spilled to describe the emergence and likely influence of the Tea Party on the American political landscape. Pundits and journalists declared that the emergence of the Tea Party movement pushed the Republican Party to a more extreme ideological position, which is generally anti-Washington. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the ideological positions taken by candidates in the 2008 and 2012 pre-Iowa caucus Republican presidential-primary debates. To establish the positions, we used the debate transcripts and a text-analytic technique that placed the candidates on a single dimension. Findings show that, overall, the 2012 candidates moved closer to an anti-Washington ideology—associated with the Tea Party movement—and away from the more traditional social conservative Republican ideology, which was more salient in the 2008 debates. Both Mitt Romney and Ron Paul, the two candidates who ran in both elections, shifted significantly in the ideological direction associated with the Tea Party.
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| 5 |
ID:
180828
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade, we have seen the rise of populist nationalist heads of state across a number of important electoral democracies—all of whom have made some version of the promise to make their countries ‘great again’. However, scholars are divided over whether these leaders' sometimes bombastic rhetoric has consistent or predictable effects on state foreign policy. This article introduces a framework for mapping the effects of populism and nationalism in foreign policy. In doing so, it draws on Essex School discourse analysis and sociological frame analysis to argue that representational crises at the sub-state level increase the popular resonance of ‘sovereigntist frames’ that diagnose the causes of perceived gaps in representation of the ‘authentic’ sovereign community at the international level and enjoin chief executives to resolve these gaps through revisionist foreign policy practices. The ethno-nationalist master frame prescribes policies and practices of lateral revisionism (conflict with neighbours or rival states), the populist frame prescribes systemic revisionism (conflict with allies and the international ‘establishment’), while the ethno-populist frame prescribes omni-revisionism (conflict with both). The article illustrates the effects of these disparate sovereigntist movements across three paired case-studies drawn from Europe, Latin America and the United States. It concludes that nationalism has greater destructive effects for the international system when combined with populism, demonstrating the importance of distinguishing nationalism and populism conceptually in order to isolate their separate and combined effects on foreign policy.
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| 6 |
ID:
079908
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do some minorities seek affirmative action while others pursue territorial autonomy or secession, given similar conditions at the substate level? This article attempts to unpack the puzzle of minority radicalization, focusing on group claim-making as an important dynamic that has been overlooked by much of the recent quantitative literature on ethnic conflict. To address this gap, the authors introduce a new `claims' variable, which codes the demands made by groups in the Minorities at Risk dataset for three five-year periods from 1985 to 2000. The authors examine the relationship between minority claim-making and rebellion and conclude that they are similar but distinct forms of group mobilization. Groups use claims as a means of bargaining with the center; relative power, therefore, has a critical influence on the extremity of demands that groups advance against the government. The authors test this model against alternative arguments using ordinal logit analysis and find that factors related to strategic power - including a history of autonomy, outside military support, and territorial concentration - are all positively correlated with a group's propensity to advance more extreme demands. This study shows that minorities with greater power vis-à-vis the center are more likely to both rebel and mobilize around separatist demands. However, minority rebellion - unlike separatist claims - may also be triggered by group deprivation, indicating that violent resistance may be driven by grievances as well as opportunities
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