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| 1 |
ID:
123178
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article attempts to contradict the commonly accepted assumption in Israel and the West that in April-May 1973 Egypt and Syria were about to open war against Israel and were deterred by a series of measures that Israel took, including partial mobilization of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) reserves. The article ventures to separate the apologetics and (flawed) memories from the information provided by the now available documentary evidence. After presenting the prevailing Israeli version, the article analyses the memoirs on the Egyptian side about the preparations for war and determining D-Day, to refute this version. Based on the contemporary protocols of government and general staff meetings and political-military consultations, it argues that the Israeli government, general staff and intelligence community did not regard at the time the outbreak of war as an imminent threat. The steps they took concerned the medium and long run, and were irrelevant in the short run. Similarly, the mobilization of reserves was not connected to the alarm of war but to the Day of Independence parade in Jerusalem. The article claims on the basis of these protocols that the reason for the excitement was the collapse of the Israeli intelligence's conception that Egypt would not resume hostilities before it could hit at the interior of Israel, and Syria would not go to war without Egypt. The arrival of Libyan Mirages and Iraqi Hunters to Egypt in April fulfilled this condition and the possibility of war could not be dismissed offhand. Israel responded to the new situation by the book. It shared the information and analysis with the White House and the CIA; it refreshed the IDF planning down to the divisional level and the IDF general staff held a series of thorough discussions to estimate the situation. The bottom line of this process was a government directive to the IDF to prepare for war at the end of the summer of 1973 (as it actually happened). In the latter portion of the article I explain why this directive was ignored when it was put to test in late September and early October of 1973.
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| 2 |
ID:
103239
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| 3 |
ID:
119845
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| 4 |
ID:
124231
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the 1970s, women have been increasingly integratÂed into the military; in Iraq and Afghanistan many women served on the frontline in combat. This article argues women's integraÂtion has been facilitated by the all-volunteer professional forces in which individuals are judged purely by competence. Female soldiers have been accepted in all military roles if they perform competently. There are serious limitations in the infantry, however, as only a small number of women pass the selection tests and it is likely no more than one percent of the infantry could be female at present. MoreÂover, masculine prejudices abound and women are still the victims of discrimination, harassment, and abuse.
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| 5 |
ID:
108256
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| 6 |
ID:
071403
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| 7 |
ID:
079765
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| 8 |
ID:
133747
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the impact that Operation Spring of Youth, carried out by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on 10 April 1973 had on Lebanon. IDF Special Forces infiltrated the heart of Beirut and eliminated three senior members of the Black September organization, perpetrator of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. While Israelis celebrated the successful military operation, the Lebanese mourned. Following the Israeli raid, the Lebanese government resigned, and an armed conflict erupted between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian organizations, leading to both domestic and inter-Arab crises. When these clashes ended, the Lebanese government had been unable to enforce its authority over Palestinian organizations, and Lebanon's weakness was publicly exposed.
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| 9 |
ID:
084592
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| 10 |
ID:
069917
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