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| 1 |
ID:
059719
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| 2 |
ID:
156070
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| 3 |
ID:
192142
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| Summary/Abstract |
The coining of the concept of ‘European sovereignty’ by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2017 has prompted a heated debate, reviving disputes over supranationality, the nation-state and democracy that have resonated since the inception of the European project. Macron’s intervention came at a time when a flurry of crises compelled the European Union to move from its ambition of being a ‘normative power’ to living through its ‘Machiavellian moment’, against the backdrop of the rise of new global powers and existential threats for the security of the Union and its member states. But the term ‘European sovereignty’ is a misnomer. The real issue is one of power, not of sovereignty. Power proceeds from command, hardly an attribute of the complex shared decision-making process of the EU, leaving the objective of becoming a fully-fledged power out of reach for the European polity.
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| 4 |
ID:
096499
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region.
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| 5 |
ID:
100538
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| 6 |
ID:
074447
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| 7 |
ID:
074138
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| 8 |
ID:
170498
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| Publication |
Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
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| Description |
xxxiv, 520p.: figures, tableshbk
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| Standard Number |
9783319625898
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059817 | 327.6/NAG 059817 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
123792
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The range of potentially looming or very real threats is broad, as are the assets already used today, be it, Iran's underground nuclear enrichment sites or Islamist irregulars in Toyotas. This survey is a stroll through recent selected developments in modern air to ground weapons (ATGW) countering these threats.
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| 10 |
ID:
032956
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| Publication |
New York, Franklem Watts, Inc., 1963.
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| Description |
76p.Hbk
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| Series |
Military History of World War II
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| Contents |
Vol. VI
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 008098 | 940.54/DUP 008098 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
105882
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| 12 |
ID:
122141
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| 13 |
ID:
123811
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article evaluates several defense products including the Excalibur, a 155 mm extended range guided artillery shell developed by Tucson, Arizona-based Raytheon Missile Systems Co., the 120mm Precision Extended Range Mortar (PERM) made for the U.S. armed forces by Alliant Techsystems Inc. and the new trajectory correction system from General Directorate for Armament, a French government defense procurement agency.
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| 14 |
ID:
079121
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| 15 |
ID:
064713
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| 16 |
ID:
066598
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| 17 |
ID:
181709
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| Summary/Abstract |
France has emerged as a country with ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. It has vast territories, population and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific which necessitate a coherent national security policy towards this region. Even before the promulgation of its Indo-Pacific strategy, France has been involved in maritime Asia, primarily through defence sales. The changing balance of power has renewed European attention towards the Indo-Pacific wherein France is making its mark. This article studies the drivers of the French Indo-Pacific strategy and goes further to understand the fundamentals that have led to French attention to this region. A careful study of all major French policy articles lays out the strategic thinking in Paris. The article briefly presents bilateral and multilateral engagements of France. While traditional and non-traditional security issues and normative drive are apparent in the public discourse, it is clear that the major drivers are France's military–industrial complex and the desire to be able to influence the regional order.
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| 18 |
ID:
114755
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The concept of security sector reform (SSR) was first formulated by UK development actors. Since 2008, France has officially adopted an SSR strategy and promoted the concept at the European level during the country's 2008 EU Presidency. However, what appears on paper to resemble full support from French institutions is in fact more complex. If the anglophone roots of the policy initiative do not seemingly explain its lack of institutionalization in the French context, it would appear that the difficulty faced by the French administration in finding a whole-of-government agreement on what the content of SSR should be, does.
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| 19 |
ID:
091791
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the growing conventional wisdom that apologies and other acts of contrition are necessary for international reconciliation. I create and test a theory that connects a country's remembrance with that country's image-threatening or benign-in the eyes of former adversaries. I evaluate the theory in two post-World War II case studies: South Korean relations with Japan and French relations with Germany.
This article offers three major findings. First, it substantiates the claim that denials inhibit reconciliation. Japanese denials and history textbook omissions have elevated distrust and fear among Koreans (as well as Chinese and Australians). Second, although whitewashing and denials are indeed pernicious, the conventional wisdom about the healing power of contrition must be seriously reconsidered. Evidence from the Japanese and other cases suggests that contrition risks triggering a domestic backlash, which alarms former adversaries. Finally, there is good news for the prospects of international reconciliation: countries have reconciled quite successfully without any contrition at all. West Germany actually offered very little contrition at the time of its dramatic reconciliation with France; many other countries have restored close and productive relations without contrition. The best course for reconciliation is to remember the past in ways that are unifying, rather than divisive, and minimize the risk of backlash.
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| 20 |
ID:
083684
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article considers whether a specifically French 'appeasement' developed among policymakers of the inter-war years and, if so, how various appeasement strategies changed over time. It does so firstly, by attempting to define this French version of appeasement partly by reference to the historiography of French inter-war foreign policy and strategic planning. The article then considers the various impersonal forces that led to changes of course in foreign policy. These include domestic social and political pressures, economic conditions, and the changing strategic balance of power in Europe. The article suggests that French appeasement was neither a constant feature of France's international strategy in the 1930s nor simply a mirror image of its British counterpart. The foundations of French diplomacy, military thinking and strategic outlook were altogether different. By the late 1930s the limitations of actual allies, the recalcitrance of some potential friends, the elusiveness of others, had all provided a powerful fillip to proponents of appeasement, although substantial minorities continued to oppose it. Ultimately, France without a great power ally was a nation compelled to appease
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