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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
070175
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many Russian civil society organisations are directly engaging with state law enforcement agencies, particularly the police, in joint efforts to improve the performance and change the norms and values of state officials involved in administering justice. These activities are based upon a model of state-society relations that stresses the possibility of a positive relationship of mutual assistance and partnership between the state and civil society. Such assistance is often described by these organisations as helping low-level bureaucrats better perform their core organisational tasks. This model is contrasted with two alternative models of the role of civil society, which depict civil society either as teaching citizens the norms and values associated with liberal democracy, or as a potential counter-weight to an over-reaching state. Three cases studies of cooperation between NGOs and law enforcement agencies demonstrate the utility of such an approach. Although these projects suffer from some common pathologies of civil society work in Russia, they remain important, not least because of the presence of 'uncivil society' extremist groups who also are trying to influence the norms and beliefs of state law enforcement officials. The civil society activities profiled here suggest that direct, cooperative engagement with the state is one important component of long-term efforts to transform the Russian state in a more liberal, 'civil' direction.
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| 2 |
ID:
152136
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| Summary/Abstract |
The siloviki – Russian security and military personnel – are a key part of Team Putin. They are not, however, a coherent group, and there are important organizational and factional cleavages among the siloviki. Compared with some security and military forces around the world, Russian military and security forces generally lack the attributes that would make them a proactive and cohesive actor in bringing about fundamental political change in Russia. In the face of potential revolutionary change, most Russian military and security bodies do not have the cohesion or the will to defend the regime with significant violence. Russian siloviki are a conservativeforce supportive of the status quo. Future efforts by the siloviki to maintain the stability of the existing political order are most likely to be reactive, divided, and behind the scenes.
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| 3 |
ID:
082053
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does the war-making/state-making thesis, most associated with Charles Tilly, apply in the developing world If so, how? This essay reviews the bellicist literature and offers an explanation for variation in state capacity among the most war-prone states in the developing world. We investigate the influence of war on state strength in two countries, Afghanistan and Vietnam. We examine three hypothesized causal mechanisms about how war contributes to state formation: raising money, building armies, and making nations. We find that war in Vietnam contributed to state-building, while war in Afghanistan has been state-destroying. There appear to be two main factors that contributed to state-making in Vietnam that were absent in Afghanistan: the existence of a core ethnic group that had served as the basis for a relatively long-standing political community in the past, and the combination of war and revolution, which inspired state officials and facilitated the promulgation of a unifying national ideology. Of these two factors, comparative data suggest relative ethnic homogeneity is the most important. Absent these specific conditions, war is more likely to break than make states in the contemporary Third World.
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