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| 1 |
ID:
167951
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| Summary/Abstract |
In June 2018, the Chinese government initiated a new round of reforms to reshuffle
the leadership of the China Coast Guard (CCG) so as to better administer the
country’s blue territory. In contrast to the 2013 structural reform of the Chinese
government which created the CCG and made it part of the State Oceanic
Administration, a sub-ministerial organ of the Chinese State Council, the 2018
reform placed the agency under direct command of the Communist Party’s Central
Military Commission. This paper argues that the CCG today has been a formidable
maritime giant and acquired a fair ability to coordinate its patrol operations with
other agencies in recent years. In particular, the maritime law enforcement force
has been made more militarized given its close association with the Chinese
Navy. Nonetheless, despite the notable performance the CCG has made, it still
faces problems of unclear legal status and weak airborne surveillance capabilities,
keeping its institutional reform far from full completion. Moreover, a more
powerful coast guard force can on the one hand facilitate Beijing’s aim to become
a great maritime power but on the other hand lead to more security challenges as a
harsher maritime contest between China and its strategic competitors is likely to be
witnessed in the near future.
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| 2 |
ID:
167640
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates whether the People’s Republic of China and Japan perceive each other as rivals in Latin America (LA; both the Chinese and Japanese governments tend to refer to the region as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), but for the purposes of this article we focus mainly on LA), and what impact such a perception might have on their foreign policy decision-making. We take LA as a case study because China’s and Japan’s recent (re-)engagement there began almost simultaneously in the early 2000s, and has developed against the background of domestic leadership transitions, growing demands for energy and markets, as well as international political agendas in which LA might play a key role. Developing the work of Thompson [(1995). Principal rivalries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (2), 195–223; (2001). Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 557–586] and Vasquez [(1993). The War Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; (1996). Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: Aa quantitative comparative case study of the two paths to war. International Studies Quarterly, 40 (4), 531–558] on rivalry, in combination with perception theory [Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], the article suggests three indicators by which to measure the extent to which China and Japan might perceive each other as rivals. Drawing on content analysis of a range of Chinese- and Japanese-language official writing, news reports, and academic analysis, the article argues that, despite some media representation of China and Japan as competitors for resources and power in LA, in fact mutual perceptions concerning rivalry have not affected LA policy decisions of these two countries.
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| 3 |
ID:
178064
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| Summary/Abstract |
The globalisation of China’s development strategy, from its origins as infrastructure diplomacy connecting its domestic west with its Central Asian periphery, into the transnational Belt and Road Initiative encompassing the periphery of the world system, epitomises the rapid evolution of a Chinese grand strategy of great economic and political ambition. The small state of Panama is a key node in the global trading system that can make an unexpectedly large contribution to China’s national security and international influence. Accordingly, China’s economic statecraft in Panama is not only opening up the Latin America and Caribbean markets to further Chinese commercial penetration, but is simultaneously expanding its political influence in this remotest part of the global South. China’s is a two-track grand strategy positing to other nations a choice between a liberal internationalist co-prosperity and a zero-sum realist contest. This audacious approach relies on relational power amongst small states, especially semi-peripheral ones like Panama, to put China at the forefront of what is shaping up as a grand coalition of the global South collectively challenging American hegemony.
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| 4 |
ID:
179463
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| 5 |
ID:
183195
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| Summary/Abstract |
In COVID-19’s first months, US politicians and media forecast that a contrast between Chinese deception and incapability and Western success against the pandemic might fatally sink internal confidence in China’s party-state. It would also diminish China externally, as it came to be seen as endangering the world by spreading biological pollution. A “China’s Chernobyl” prediction became the latest “China collapse” wish-fulfilment. This rests on two contradictory yet co-existing Yellow Peril tropes: “deceit and incompetence” and “world domination.” However, no empirical basis exists for either notion: China prevailed against the pandemic and lacks the capacity for global hegemony. “China’s Chernobyl” is most relevant then as a wish that creates a belief, that China should and could collapse. That in turn bolsters the US-led mobilization to counter China as a “strong competitor” and frames China as the common enemy, thereby promoting Western transnational and US internal cohesion.
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| 6 |
ID:
185785
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| 7 |
ID:
157819
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this special section, the present article reviews South Korean perspectives on China's ‘periphery diplomacy’ with a focus on Chinese behaviour with respect to the East China Sea maritime territory and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). By analysing research papers published by various Korean research institutions and academic journals, this article demonstrates that most Korean scholars hold that as long as China's growth goes on, the tensions between the US and China are likely to intensify. The article also shows that one of the primary concerns of South Korean scholars lies in the question of how South Korea should respond to changing regional orders and a rising China. The article argues that South Korea's strategic dilemma is reflected in a regional structure in which competition between two great powers has recently forced the periphery to impose bilateral ties on.
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| 8 |
ID:
141376
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| 9 |
ID:
070231
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| 10 |
ID:
140759
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s presence in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry shows that it is primarily interested in developing this country’s hydrocarbon fields. Raising the production volumes of Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbons will make it possible for China to meet its own energy needs. Chinese companies presently control approximately one quarter of the oil produced in Kazakhstan and one fifth of its petroleum product market. They also occupy a relatively strong niche in such an important segment of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry as the construction and exploitation of oil and gas pipelines. In the short and medium term, the nature and scope of China’s presence in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry is unlikely to significantly change. In the long term, much will depend on whether Chinese companies gain access to “big oil” and, correspondingly, “big gas” after developing offshore deposits, primarily within the framework of the North Caspian project.
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| 11 |
ID:
174310
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scale and speed of China’s naval construction bear only one conclusion: Beijing is seeking to erode U.S. naval supremacy. This judgment requires no specialized knowledge of China or access to top secret intelligence. One need only look at the platforms the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building and the pace at which it is building them.
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| 12 |
ID:
189838
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s rapid economic development in recent decades has significantly
boosted its international political activities as evidenced by the promotion
of a set of relevant global foreign policy doctrines. Unlike the concepts
adopted under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, which were rather bombastic and ideological, China’s foreign policy conceptions adopted since the
early 2000s were based on a scientific approach. This article explores
the evolution of China’s key global foreign policy concepts, enshrined
in fundamental state and party documents, through the lens of Michel
Foucault’s methodology. Employing the “archaeology of knowledge,” we
show that the key concepts reflect China’s transformation into one of
the leaders in the system of international relations, and the genealogy
of discourse helps reveal the “reflective” nature of Chinese foreign policy
discourse in contrast to the “egoistic” American one. Having studied and
rethought the experience of the United States and Europe, China places
emphasis on universal development and prosperity, designating them as its
international policy goal.
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| 13 |
ID:
167576
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| Summary/Abstract |
China enjoys considerable popularity in the Middle East and Africa, not only among elites but also at street level. This article draws on international relations theories to explain this general pattern, as well as intra- and interregional variation. Every approach has something to contribute, but international political economy more so than realism. Constructivist theories are particularly useful in explaining China’s popularity in the Middle East and Africa.
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| 14 |
ID:
148931
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article demonstrates how scholarship on terrorism in China has provided the intellectual backdrop against which China's leadership has developed the country's counterterrorism institutions, policies, and laws. Building on the linkages between scholarship and policy-making, the article suggests potential avenues for policy reform in China's current counterterrorism architecture.
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| 15 |
ID:
151164
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues, through a case study of the evolving impact of the Xinjiang and Uyghur issue, that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ethnic minorities have been a significant factor in Beijing’s foreign relations throughout its history. Since the end of the Cold War in particular, China’s approach to the Xinjiang and Uyghur issue has played an important role in undergirding domestic stability and shaping its relations with Central Asia. More broadly, the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur suggests that the nature and scale of the challenge posed by any one ethnic minority in the context of the PRC’s foreign policy has largely been a function of the interplay of five major factors: the historical relationship between the ethnic group and the Chinese state; the geographic concentration of an ethnic minority; the degree of acculturation to the dominant Han society; external great power support; and mobilised diasporas.
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| 16 |
ID:
148218
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s defense science, technology, and industrial system has been undergoing a far-reaching transformation over the past two decades and the single biggest factor behind this turnaround is the role of external technology and knowledge transfers and the defense industry’s improving ability to absorb these inputs and convert into localized output. China is pursuing an intensive campaign to obtain defense and dual-use civil–military foreign technology transfers using a wide variety of means, which is explored in this article.
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| 17 |
ID:
165872
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| Summary/Abstract |
The variations on power transition theory so widely used to frame analysis of U.S.–China relation tend to assume the inevitability or at least strong probability of China surpassing the United States in economic power if not necessarily military power. In the terminology of social psychology’s attribution theory, China is imputed with the identity of a state that is inevitably rising. The Chinese Communist Party encourages this attribution among Chinese people and foreigners. But China’s economic rise – the foundation of its comprehensive rise – appears to have entered an inflection point in the mid-2010s and may now be stalling. In critical respects, China increasingly resembles the last two countries that ‘attempted’ a globe-level rise: the unsuccessful cases of postwar Japan and the Soviet Union. China’s labor force is shrinking; the country relies excessively on unsustainable debt increases to fuel economic growth; and pollution is seriously harming public health. But even if China’s rise conclusively stalls, it may take quite some time before the Chinese public and outside observers recognize the new reality because of intrinsic biases in the cognitive logic of attributing identities to actors.
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| 18 |
ID:
156442
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| Summary/Abstract |
Compared to inward foreign direct investment, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from China is a relatively new phenomenon. However, the volume of China's OFDI increased rapidly from 2004. There has been an increasing amount of literature on the motivations of China's OFDI, but few studies have focused on its location determinants. The present paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on two important location factors, natural resources and technology, which are the most important determinants of China's OFDI. We use a large panel dataset comprising 132 countries over the period 1991–2009 and the Tobit as well as the Heckman models to establish the relationship between the two location factors and China's OFDI. The empirical results suggest that although China's OFDI has been driven by the country's desire for a secure supply of natural resources and to attain advanced technology from the developed world, China's technology is also a critical attraction for the host developing economies.
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| 19 |
ID:
164490
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has declared a war on terrorism in Xinjiang, identifying violence in the region as a top security threat. However, what nowadays is officially constructed as ‘terrorism’ was framed as ‘counter-revolution’ in the past. Informed by the concept of macrosecuritization and the agenda of critical terrorism studies, this article examines the changing nature of Chinese state framing of violence in Xinjiang. Through a comparative analysis of the discursive construction of the Baren (1990) and Maralbeshi (2013) violent incidents, I find that the terror lexicon has replaced old narratives of counter-revolution to legitimize a sustained crackdown under a novel geopolitical context. The construction of violence in Xinjiang as terrorism, I argue, is contingent, limited and unstable. It marginalizes factors other than an extremist or separatist agency in the incubation of the violence, in particular the frictions created by the crackdown with which the Chinese government is trying to placate the unrest.
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| 20 |
ID:
157506
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite considerable differences in their level of social and economic development, China and Europe both face the challenges of energy insecurity and environmental degradation. Given their shared sustainable development objectives and the complementarity of their comparative advantages, the two have great potential for cooperation, which should provide both the motivation and capabilities to cooperate in relevant areas. However, there are a number of barriers and impediments at both the macro- and micro-levels. China and Europe should focus their joint efforts on several key areas of feasible renewable energy sector cooperation, including strengthening institutional links, facilitating bilateral investment and coordinating positions and actions in multilateral settings. Concrete cooperation in the renewable energy sector can cement the China-EU strategic partnership, thereby bringing benefits to both sides and beyond.
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