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| 1 |
ID:
000617
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1999.
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| Description |
xviii, 349p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0714649333
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041991 | 940.54214735/GLA 041991 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
096035
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This chronological and topical outline describes the institutional and doctrinal evolution of the Soviet and Russian Armies from 1946 through 2009 within the broad context of vital political, economic, and social developments and a wide range of important international and national occurrences. Its intent is to foster further informed discussion of the subject. Each of the article's sub-sections portrays military developments in the Soviet or Russian Armies during one of the eight postwar periods Soviet and Russian military scholars, themselves, routinely identify as distinct stages in the development and evolution of their Armed Forces. Each of the periods, argue Russian commentators, is distinguishable by a wide range of characteristics, both internal and external, that prove unique to each period.
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| 3 |
ID:
054571
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| Publication |
Essex, Frank Cass, 1994.
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| Description |
xvi, 446p.
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| Series |
Cass series on Soviet Military theroy and practice; vol.6
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039074 | 356.1660947/GLA 039074 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
154833
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| Summary/Abstract |
Among the most controversial questions associated with the German-Soviet War (1941–1945) is the degree to which intelligence information received from his agents abroad influenced the decision making of Josef Stalin, the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars and soon Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, particularly during the summers of 1941 and 1942, when Adolf Hitler’s German Wehrmacht conducted its strategic offensives code-named Operations Barbarossa and Blau. This article assesses this question by assessing the impact of intelligence reports Stalin received from Richard Zorge (Sorge in German), a Soviet agent situated in Tokyo, Japan, prior to and during the Barbarossa invasion.
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| 5 |
ID:
048697
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1997.
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| Description |
xv, 511p.Hbk
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| Series |
Cass Series on Soviet Military Experience, Vol. 2.
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| Standard Number |
0714633755
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039417 | 940.54/GLA 039417 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
048786
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1992.
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| Description |
viii, 360p.
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| Series |
Cass series on Soviet military theory and practice
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| Standard Number |
0714634352
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039075 | 355.033547/GLA 039075 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
158506
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| Summary/Abstract |
Massive recent archival releases by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation promise to revolutionize the historiography of the Soviet-German War, 1941–1945. Hitherto, heavily censored Soviet books and articles concealed much of the detail concerning how and why the Red Army operated as it did during wartime. Although these sources revealed considerable detail concerning the Red Army’s wartime military successes, they contained precious little about less-successful or clearly unsuccessful operations or numbers and figures related to the strength and losses of Red Army forces. This forced historians studying the war to rely heavily on German source materials or to ‘read between the lines’ while interpreting existing Soviet books and articles about the war. As the details in the following article indicate, this situation has drastically changed for the better, while doing so necessitating a thorough re-evaluation of the performance of the Soviet Union’s Red Army during its so-called Great Patriotic War.
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| 8 |
ID:
078274
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military historians have written volumes about German Operation Blau, Hitler's offensive toward Stalingrad and into the Caucasus region in the summer of 1942, and about the ensuing dramatic battle for Stalingrad. However, they have paid far less attention to the military operations which preceded the famous German offensive. In addition to setting the stage for Operation Blau and conditioning German successes during the summer, the operations provided context for the climactic struggle that ensued in the Stalingrad and Caucasus regions. Exploiting new books on these subjects, as well as recent archival releases, this article summarizes the nature of those preliminary military operations, and by doing so provides necessary context for the more famous battle.
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| 9 |
ID:
070650
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| 10 |
ID:
048778
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1991.
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| Description |
xxvi, 263p.
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| Standard Number |
0714633739
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039076 | 355.40947/GLA 039076 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
140651
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| Edition |
1st ed.
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass and company limited, 1989.
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| Description |
xl, 644p.: ill., mapshbk
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| Series |
Sovet Military Theory and Practice
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| Standard Number |
071463347X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039077 | 940.541247/GLA 039077 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
054278
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1990.
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| Description |
xv, 422p.
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| Series |
Cass series on Soviet military theory and practice; no.3
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| Standard Number |
0714633747
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039078 | 355.34320947/GLA 039078 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
047128
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1991.
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| Description |
xxiv, 295p.
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| Standard Number |
0714633623
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044683 | 355.00947/GLA 044683 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
048781
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1991.
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| Description |
xxiv, 295p.
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| Series |
Cass series on Soviet military theory and practice
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| Standard Number |
0714633623
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039079 | 355.00947/GLA 039079 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
135930
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most controversial questions in regard to the Soviet Union’s conduct of the war against Hitler’s Nazi Germany (1941–1945) was the extent to which Joseph Stalin, the country’s ruler, conducted military operations designed to advance the country’s post-war political objectives. Historians, who have long debated this matter, have generally based their judgments on the reality of the post-war structure in Europe—specifically, the establishment of Communist puppet governments behind what Winston Churchill described as the ‘iron curtain’. Truth regarding Stalin’s political intent has generally eluded them because archival documents necessary to validate their conclusions have been unavailable. Now, however, the slow but steady opening of the Soviet Union’s (Russian) military archives provides fresh evidence upon which to judge Stalin’s wartime intent. This article surveys this evidence, principally wartime directives issued by the USSR’s State Defense Committee and Stavka (Supreme High Command), which indicate that Stalin did indeed orchestrate the Red Army’s military operations to secure distinct political objectives within and outside the borders of the pre-war Soviet Union. By no means definitive in its conclusions, the article summons further debate and discussion on this important historical matter.
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