| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
089219
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Scholarly work on the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States that began in the early 1970s has mainly focused on the strategic and security concerns that underlay that development.1 Yet, during the early phases of the new relationship political-economic problems, involving claims for expropriated property and commercial policy matters, had a telling impact on U.S. policymaking and Sino-American relations. Believing that the development of trade between the United States and China could be a significant element of the rapprochement, the Nixon administration assumed that commercial prospects depended on resolving thorny difficulties from the years of overt hostility, mainly the PRC assets blocked by the U.S. Treasury and U.S. private claims over property seized by the PRC. During early 1973, U.S. and PRC diplomats began talks over ways and means to settle those problems. Yet, neither the Nixon nor the Ford administrations could reach a claims-assets settlement with Beijing; what became contentious negotiations deadlocked until after the Carter administration came to power.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
070861
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
167789
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
At the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, top US policy makers did not believe that Israel had produced nuclear weapons. Since the discovery of the Dimona reactor complex in 1960, senior US officials and intelligence experts took it for granted that the Israelis sought a nuclear-weapon capability, but a wall of secrecy surrounded the reactor. Even inspection visits by US nuclear experts left important questions unanswered. A central problem was whether Israel had acquired or would acquire the reprocessing plant needed to produce plutonium. While the original plans for Dimona included an underground reprocessing plant, it was deeply secret. A few months before the war, State Department intelligence experts suspected that the Israelis had begun reprocessing and could even have stockpiled a few devices, but this perception was not shared at the top. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration would have been profoundly shocked if US intelligence had discovered the secret assembly of nuclear devices in May 1967. Strict secrecy in Israel may have averted a crisis in US–Israeli relations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
097986
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New York, The New Press, 1999.
|
| Description |
xix, 515p.
|
| Standard Number |
9781565845688
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055142 | 327.73/BUR 055142 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|