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| 1 |
ID:
192086
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since early 2023, China has sought to play a more active crisis resolution role in the Russia-Ukraine war, marking a shift in Chinese behaviour on the conflict. What explains China’s pursuit of this role, an agenda that has been described as a ‘fool’s errand,’ not least because of the seeming difficulties of real peace between Kyiv and Moscow without one side capitulating to the other? One interpretation is that China’s behaviour is part of a broader trend of ambitions to play a bigger role in addressing global hotspots and project itself as a responsible power. It parallels Beijing’s involvement in brokering the Saudi-Iran rapprochement as well as attempts to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, such ambitions are only part of the story. There are more contingent considerations behind the subtle but distinct change in Chinese positioning on the war. Far from being a ‘fool’s errand,’ Beijing’s peacemaker posturing is borne out of calculations taken to minimise risks to Chinese interests as a consequence of the war. Taking into account documentary sources and views from China, this article unpacks those calculations to provide a fuller explanation behind the shift in Chinese behaviour.
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| 2 |
ID:
070970
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In July 2002 Spain and Morocco almost came to blows over a small island in the Strait of Gibraltar. Successive occupations of Parsley Island occurred during a protracted period of tension between the two countries. The sustained expansion of cooperation between the two countries in the 1980s and 1990s ultimately seemed to have failed to produce the regional stability that had been the prime objective of Spanish diplomacy. Increased interdependence between these Mediterranean neighbours had failed to deter them from resorting to pressure and military action. Theories of interdependence, though generally developed in relation to other contexts, suggest that Spanish-Moroccan relations were built upon too narrow an agenda, primarily economic, which failed to address 'difficult' aspects of the relationship, such as regime differences and historically based cultural tensions. Changes in the external relations priorities of the two states, both before and after 9/11, also contributed to the crisis, which was thus a product of changed circumstances as well as deficient strategy. Crisis resolution came through mediation by the United States following another CFSP failure for the EU, notwithstanding common Spanish-Moroccan commitment to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
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