| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In July 2002 Spain and Morocco almost came to blows over a small island in the Strait of Gibraltar. Successive occupations of Parsley Island occurred during a protracted period of tension between the two countries. The sustained expansion of cooperation between the two countries in the 1980s and 1990s ultimately seemed to have failed to produce the regional stability that had been the prime objective of Spanish diplomacy. Increased interdependence between these Mediterranean neighbours had failed to deter them from resorting to pressure and military action. Theories of interdependence, though generally developed in relation to other contexts, suggest that Spanish-Moroccan relations were built upon too narrow an agenda, primarily economic, which failed to address 'difficult' aspects of the relationship, such as regime differences and historically based cultural tensions. Changes in the external relations priorities of the two states, both before and after 9/11, also contributed to the crisis, which was thus a product of changed circumstances as well as deficient strategy. Crisis resolution came through mediation by the United States following another CFSP failure for the EU, notwithstanding common Spanish-Moroccan commitment to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
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