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| 1 |
ID:
078783
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The main aim of this article is to examine the role-perception and operation of European Commission officials towards Northern Ireland and the peace process. A relative gap in the theoretical literature, until recently, on the Commission's endogenous preferences is highlighted. The main conclusion is that the European Commission's preferences towards conflict resolution in Northern Ireland have altered since 1994 and that Commission officials exhibit a greater analytical understanding and proactive approach to Northern Ireland. The cause of this change has not been socialization into `European' supranational norms, but instead has reflected the impact of British and Irish cooperation and agreement.
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| 2 |
ID:
101441
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent waves of new immigration distinct from postcolonial-era migrations can be identified in many Western countries. More than 40 such "new immigrant" candidates contested the 2009 local government elections in the Republic of Ireland. This article draws on interviews with just under half of these and on official responses from each of the Republic's five political parties to a study of "new immigrant" participation in Irish politics. It also draws on a specific locality case study of the border town of Dundalk where support for Sinn Fin, Ireland's most distinctly ethno-nationalist political party, is relatively high. Our analysis of "new immigrant" candidate participation in Irish politics suggests that a number of factors influence responsiveness to these; this article focuses on the salience of theories of racialization, ethnic nepotism, and localism. In particular, the findings emphasize how local identities as manifested by immigrant candidates potentially mediate racial and ethnic barriers.
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| 3 |
ID:
110380
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We examine the impact of recent tax reforms in Ireland on private car transport and its greenhouse gas emissions. A carbon tax was introduced on fuels, and purchase (vehicle registration) and ownership (motor) taxes were switched from engine size to potential emissions. We use a demographic model of the car stock (by age, size, and fuel) and a car purchase model that reflects the heterogeneous distribution of mileage and usage costs across various engine sizes. The model shows a dramatic shift from petrol to diesel cars, particularly for large engines. The same pattern is observed in the latest data on car sales. This has a substantial impact on tax revenue as car owners shift to the lower tax rates. The tax burden has shifted from car ownership to car use, and that the overall tax burden on private car transport falls. As diesel engines are more fuel efficient than petrol engines, carbon dioxide emissions fall modestly or, if we consider the rebound effect of travel costs on mileage, minimally. From the perspective of the revenue, the costs per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided are (very) high.
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| 4 |
ID:
134172
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A common criticism levelled at successive governments of the Republic of Ireland during the Northern Ireland 'Troubles' was their alleged inactivity in the face of a ferocious Provisional IRA campaign. Such criticisms were based in large part on the perception of the southern state as a supply base for militant republicanism. The Republic was undoubtedly a formidable logistics hinterland for such militants. However, criticisms of the reactions of authorities in the south are unfair. This article considers the explosives capabilities of the IRA during the first six years of their campaign. It does so with reference to their attempts to obtain commercial explosives as well as measures employed by them to obtain homemade explosives. The article also considers countermeasures employed by the southern government and reveals the extent to which they sought to shut down IRA capabilities in the south. It is argued that, ultimately, the IRA's campaign in this regard could only be contained and never unilaterally halted.
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| 5 |
ID:
071167
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