| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
075030
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| 2 |
ID:
074231
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| 3 |
ID:
075289
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| 4 |
ID:
113162
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
'Before we send our troops into a foreign country, we should know how and when we're going to get them out', US National Security Adviser Anthony Lake intoned in 1996, two years after the precipitate withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. Yet rarely has this requirement been met. Planning for exit as precisely as Lake's comments would suggest is difficult if not impossible, as the Clinton administration would discover in Bosnia and Herzegovina only months later. No one can foresee the circumstances that will obtain, and the course adjustments they may necessitate, once an operation has been launched. But this is not to say that more informed planning for exit is not possible. Not only has the subject of exit strategies received comparatively little sustained scholarly attention; it is also fair to say that policy in this area has been more ad hoc than carefully thought out.
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| 5 |
ID:
171347
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the majority of research on revolving-door lobbyists centers on the influence they exercise during their postgovernment careers, relatively little attention is given to whether future career concerns affect the behaviors of revolving-door lobbyists while they still work in government. We argue that the revolving-door incentivizes congressional staffers to showcase their legislative skills to the lobbying market in ways that affect policymaking in Congress. Using comprehensive data on congressional staffers, we find that employing staffers who later become lobbyists is associated with higher legislative productivity for members of Congress, especially in staffers’ final terms in Congress. It also is associated with increases in a member’s bill sponsorship in the areas of health and commerce, the topics most frequently addressed by clients in the lobbying industry, as well as granting more access to lobbying firms. These results provide the systematic empirical evidence of pre-exit effects of the revolving-door among congressional staff.
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| 6 |
ID:
075120
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| 7 |
ID:
071501
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| 8 |
ID:
074258
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| 9 |
ID:
074700
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| 10 |
ID:
071299
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| 11 |
ID:
074985
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