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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
184982
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian armed forces’ lacklustre performance in Ukraine has surprised military analysts. Shortcomings have included breakdowns in logistics, poor equipment and morale, abysmal communications, and muddled command and control, as well as a weak showing by the Russian Aerospace Forces, air defence, and cruise and ballistic missiles. Chief among the contributing factors are wishful political thinking, overreliance on esoteric doctrine and endemic corruption. War, however, brutally exposes peacetime cheating. Consequently, estimates of Russian military capabilities – in particular, for large-formation combined-arms operations, logistics, air defence and intangibles such as morale – need to be carefully reassessed. Earlier analyses of a Russia–NATO conflict appear to have overstated the challenge of defending Europe. Looking ahead, the conventional threat from Russia seems less daunting than previously thought, and the country faces a formidable task in repairing depleted capabilities. That said, President Vladimir Putin’s appetite for risk is greater than anticipated.
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| 2 |
ID:
148991
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Russian Federation’s approach to the use of armed force abroad is a concern for other states. This case study of Russian armed force use against Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 employs an analytical framework based on Russian conceptualizations. Distinguishing between military and non-military means and measures, we analyze Russia’s deployment of armed forces to carry out measures in interstate conflict resolution, focusing on military forces deployed for non-military measures. We find that the use of armed forces in Ukraine largely conforms to Russian conceptualizations, allowing for extensive fighting without it amounting to a military conflict in the Russian view.
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| 3 |
ID:
188456
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| Summary/Abstract |
After Vladimir Putin declared a partial Russian mobilisation in late September 2022 and annexed four additional Ukrainian regions, there was little to suggest that a negotiated settlement would be possible while he remained in power. This article instead explores three possible military outcomes of the war – an outright Ukrainian or Russian military victory, and a war of attrition. As of November 2022, a Ukrainian victory, so unlikely at the outset of Russia’s invasion, is a distinct possibility, provided the West offers sufficient military materiel and training swiftly enough. Russian forces have suffered heavy casualties and are low on precision-guided munitions, with their logistics under fire and having lost much of what air dominance they had. Hence, Moscow’s battlefield fortunes hinge on whether mobilised, poorly trained and equipped forces will be able to hold defensive lines over the winter to buy time to build new, more capable units, with troop morale ever more crucial, but also brittle. A key unknown, however, is the state of Ukrainian forces. Importantly, the scale and intensity of the war, the vital interests at stake and international involvement on both sides all gravitate towards a more drawn-out war over the winter and beyond.
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| 4 |
ID:
071454
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