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| 1 |
ID:
102765
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| 2 |
ID:
092718
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| 3 |
ID:
092927
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The abduction of 16 Japanese citizens from Japan by agents of the North Korean government took place from 1977 to 1983. In spite of a series of negotiations on this issue between the two countries, little has changed after the return of the five abductees and their family members in 2004. It is high time for Japan to ask such questions as: Has Japan failed? Is it really possible to bring all the abductees back? If not, what went wrong? This paper argues that Japan's massive public relations strategy toward its citizens, although successful in garnering public support, eventually backfired on the government: it left too little room for them to negotiate with North Korea. However, with the attention of the public being diverted from the abduction issue for a while, it may be a good time for Japan to overhaul its negotiation strategy.
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| 4 |
ID:
128428
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's aggressive actions in the East China Sea, combined with other factors, especially North Korea's continuing intransigence, have created an increasingly hostile security environment for Japan. Its response to these events can be seen in the impressive political rebirth of Shinzo Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party. While Abe, currently serving as prime minister for a second time, was elected largely because of his economic policies and the ineptitude of the formerly ruling Democratic Party of Japan, he has used his mandate to press forward with long needed, albeit controversial, defense and security reforms that indicate the seriousness with which Tokyo takes its current situation. With China looming up in front of them, and Pyongyang posing lesser but still worrisome threats, the Japanese have become acutely aware of the fact that their Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have one hundred and forty thousand ground troops, one hundred and forty-one maritime vessels, and four hundred and ten aircraft, while China's People's Liberation Army has one million six hundred thousand troops and North Korea has one million soldiers. Meanwhile, North Korea maintains a significant, if decaying, navy and air force, with one hundred and ninety vessels and approximately six hundred aircraft. China's much more capable maritime and air assets include nine hundred and seventy vessels and two thousand five hundred and eighty aircraft.
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| 5 |
ID:
109834
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| 6 |
ID:
186108
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the ways in which the North Korean regime filters and re-interprets various ‘messages’ from the outside world for its domestic audience through the lens of state-produced literature. In broad strokes, I identify three main types of foreign interactions purported to send a ‘message’ to North Korea – economic sanctions, summit diplomacy and military exercises/fleet movements – and examine how these are treated in North Korean fiction produced by the Korean Writer’s Union, an important arm of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department. Each of the three interaction types represents a formal effort by an outside government – typically the United States or its allies – to send a message to the regime or its people and thereby shape their behavior and/or perception of the outside world. By examining how these ‘messages’ are portrayed in North Korean fiction, we can gain insight into how the regime shapes internal narratives about foreign affairs, as well as what sort of alternative narratives it is most anxious to intercept or disrupt.
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| 7 |
ID:
060603
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| 8 |
ID:
192960
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This article explores how claims alleging serious human rights violations or breaches of international criminal law that occurred in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) might unfold in the courts of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) under various differing jurisdictional theories. South Korea has legislation allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, an increasingly widespread judicial mechanism for a national court to hold alleged perpetrators of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations accountable for their actions regardless of where the crime was committed and regardless of the victim's or the perpetrator's nationality. In South Korea, domestic criminal and civil jurisdiction can conceivably be "stretched" to encompass crimes perpetrated on the northern half of the Korean peninsula due to a constitutional provision that denies the existence of a separate North Korean sovereign nation. This article introduces and compares the feasibility and challenges of various jurisdictional approaches in South Korea that could address human rights crimes in North Korea, specifically (a) universal jurisdiction prosecution based on domestic law, (b) domestic criminal prosecution, and (c) civil cases in tort.
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| 9 |
ID:
100214
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| 10 |
ID:
156842
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| Summary/Abstract |
Paul Sinclair discusses President Trump’s approach to the challenge presented by North Korea.
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| 11 |
ID:
153580
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During the Open Port period and Japanese colonial period (1876–1945), Koreans generally had a positive image of the United States. This positive view of the United States held by Koreans persisted until after liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. The United States was a ‘liberator’ that saved the Koreans, and was viewed as ‘a cooperator’ with whom Korea was to solve its national task of establishing a new country. However, the concept of ‘American imperialist warmonger’ had begun to be promoted in North Korea from 1948–49. It was a concept advanced by the Soviet Union and the North Korean leadership. The negative image of the United States, which spread throughout North Korea from the early years of the Cold War, was merely a perplexing stigma lacking substantiated grounds. However, the experiences of the Korean War actualized the image of the United States as a ‘warmonger’ in the hearts of the North Korean people. Alleged indiscriminate aerial bombings, mass slaughters, sexual assaults, and arson attacks against Korean civilians became the most important reason for the expansion of intense sentiment. Anti-Americanism began to be systemized and routinized in every aspect of North Korean life after the Korean War.
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| 12 |
ID:
158540
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Defection from North Korea to South Korea has increased dramatically, but little is known of its political consequences. Do North Korean defectors successfully adopt democratic norms, and if so, what factors aid this process? Through a novel survey of defectors, I find that national identification plays a significant role in motivating their fledgling sense of democratic obligation. Greater feelings of national unity with South Koreans lead to a stronger duty to vote and otherwise contribute to the democratic state. This effect is more powerful than that of conventional contractual factors, on which most state resettlement policies are based, and is surprising given that defectors’ nationalist socialization mostly took place under the authoritarian North. The findings suggest the need to reconsider integration approaches toward North Korean defectors and similarly placed refugees elsewhere.
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| 13 |
ID:
130549
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Purpose-Discuss the potential of non-state centric economic cooperation.
Design/methodology/approach-Traditional engagement policies vis-à-vis North Korea have been state-centric, reciprocity-driven and ultimately, unsuccessful. This article proposes the promotion of sustainable, good-faith and meaningful economic exchanges by enrolling the active participation of North Korean elites through alignment with their vested interests.
Findings-Although controversial and even abhorrent from a normative perspective, the approach is eminently pragmatic and necessary to address the limited policy alternatives of an increasingly insecure regime which may eventually be forced to pursue drastic means to ensure its survival.
Practical implications-Non-state-centric international economic engagement is a non-exclusive policy prescription that seeks to broaden the range of viable policy options available to the North Korean regime.
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| 14 |
ID:
155574
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North Korea in July test-launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Such long-range capability, coupled with nuclear warhead advances, has been considered a U.S. redline that could draw a U.S. military response.
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| 15 |
ID:
102185
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| 16 |
ID:
166018
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This article analyzes the way in which American politicians and experts debate the problem of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, is analyzed from the viewpoint of how likely it is that a consensus can be reached in the domestic politics of the United States. The views of the most influential groups of the American establishment in the Democratic and Republican parties are examined in the context of current events in the region. The authors conclude that since these views largely coincide with the denuclearization policy of President Donald Trump, the administration and Congress will reach a full consensus on this issue.
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| 17 |
ID:
162101
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| 18 |
ID:
103825
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| Publication |
London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011.
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| Description |
340p.
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| Standard Number |
9781408817001
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055947 | 327.1747/ELB 055947 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
137235
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| Summary/Abstract |
Twenty years after the deal struck between the United States and North Korea over the nuclear crisis, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula remains unstable. When it comes to the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1994 through 2002, previous research has paid scant attention to how the U.S. Congress responded to President Clinton’s accord with the Pyongyang regime. This article
provides a rare empirical assessment of what led America’s lawmakers to uphold or overturn the executive agreements with North Korea. The bottom-line finding is that politics hardly stops at the water’s edge, with “politics-as-usual” forces such as partisan conflicts ultimately having derailed Congressional commitments to the U.S.-DPRK accords. The results shed light on how and why domestic politics often redirects the course of international agreements, particularly in the era of
polarized politics.
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| 20 |
ID:
146645
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the link between development and peacebuilding to analyze South Korean aid activities in North Korea in the context of the Korean conflict, where there are deep-rooted cycles of conflict episodes, and to explore the possibility of aid for peace on the Korean peninsula in the future. The Korean conflict is a large part of what makes South Korean aid to North Korea ineffective. For the past 20 years, South Korean aid to North Korea has fluctuated greatly, due to the context of the Korean conflict. The Korean conflict, once seemingly on the way to resolution, appears to have reverted to a time before the end of the Cold War. Many people in both the North and the South still see each other as the enemy. Most of the South Korean aid projects in North Korea have been suspended indefinitely and the fluctuation of aid to North Korea caused serious debates within South Korean society. At one point, the debates grew so heated that they were called the ‘South–South conflict’. Building on the conceptual framework of conflict sensitive development and strategic peacebuilding, this article argues that, to overcome the current impasse, all stakeholders must better understand the context of the Korean conflict and the interaction between the context and themselves, and develop a comprehensive strategy together, to encompass the multiple issues raised by the Korean conflict, as strategic peacebuilding proposes.
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