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| 1 |
ID:
089320
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| 2 |
ID:
085580
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| Summary/Abstract |
India faces challenges like never before when it comes to tackling the lower end of the spectrum of warfare. The ongoing conflict with the Naxalites and the terror attacks in Mumbai are but grim reminders of this new relity. Preparing for the big battle has always been the raison detre of most militaries the world over.
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| 3 |
ID:
080596
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| 4 |
ID:
106480
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| 5 |
ID:
113270
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The secular, pluralistic, ethnically diverse, and vibrant democracy that India has nurtured ever since its independence in 1947 has become the envy of many radical and extremist ideologies and religions that seek to bring in order through tools of fourth generation warfare like Jihad and "Proxy War." Typical examples of such conflicts facing India are the ones being waged against her by Jehadi organizations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other proxy factions supported by the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence Agency. Despite a few pro-active measures instituted by the government of India after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, there is no clear counter-terrorism policy that has been articulated either in the form of a doctrine or white paper. If India has to dispel the image of being a "soft state," it is imperative that the government clearly spells out its stand on terrorism.
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| 6 |
ID:
156733
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| 7 |
ID:
139183
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article tracks the evolution of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into a potent fighting force by analysing the broad contours of joint operations and the air war between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and PAF in 1965. Led by aggressive commanders like Asghar Khan and Nur Khan, the PAF seized the initiative in the air on the evening of 6 September 1965 with a coordinated strike from Sargodha, Mauripur and Peshawar against four major Indian airfields, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and Jamnagar. The IAF riposte to PAF strikes came early next morning at dawn on 7 September. Over the next ten days, IAF surprised an overconfident PAF with its tenacity and individual combat proficiency. The article concludes by offering a critical analysis of the opeational performance of PAF in the conflict and an objective qualitative comparison with the performance of the IAF.
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| 8 |
ID:
071493
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| 9 |
ID:
174279
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| Publication |
Noida, HarperCollins Publishers, 2020.
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| Description |
xii, 469p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789353578053
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059909 | 355.020954/SUB 059909 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
174929
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| Summary/Abstract |
The non-use of offensive air power in the India-China conflict of 1962 is among the most discussed issues in the contemporary India-China discourse. There was a complete lack of understanding on the part of the strategic establishment of what offensive air power could achieve in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Compounding this was a lack of clarity within the Indian Army of the value addition provided by the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) fighter fleet and a diffident approach on the part of the IAF leadership to espouse the use of offensive air power. However, the sterling contribution of the IAF’s transport and helicopter fleet during the conflict merits a re-examination.
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| 11 |
ID:
130726
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The winter of 2011 was a dramatic period for air power in Mediterranean Europe and India. Operation Unified Protector (OUP), the successful North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offensive aerial campaign that paved the way for a regime change in Libya, involved two platforms that had been shortlisted for the largest fighter aircraft deal of recent times. In the race for the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF), both the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale-platforms that were well exploited during the Libyan campaign-had been shortlisted over the much fancied US fighters, the F-18 and the F-16. Taking note of the highly professional conduct of the IAF during the flight trials, both the UK and France attempted to woo the IAF by showcasing the capabilities of the aircraft and other enabling platforms against the backdrop of their successful employment in diverse roles during OUP from March to October 2011. Numerous presentations were made at various seminars in New Delhi by Royal Air Force (RAF) and French Air Force (FAF) operational commanders who had taken part in the campaign, both at operational and tactical levels.
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| 12 |
ID:
104450
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| 13 |
ID:
076059
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| 14 |
ID:
118144
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Air power has gone through a lot over the last two decades-from being a decisive tool of war fighting during Operation Desert Storm and operations over Kosovo, to a more sobering period in the first decade of this century when it faced intense criticism over its use in Lebanon, Iraq and Af-Pak. The resilience and versatility of air power ensured that it adapted to the requirements of modern conflict, albeit a trifle slower than expected, with Operation Geronimo (the mission to eliminate Osama bin Laden) and Operation Unified Protector (the aerial campaign to facilitate the ouster of the Libyan dictator Gadaffi) being prime examples. Some air power theorists feel that practitioners of air power may have got carried away by the seductiveness of technology and precision, leading to the wrong strategic application of air power in some places. Thus, a need is felt to revisit current global air power discourse from a theoretical perspective and create a convergence of sorts between the strategist, theorist and practitioner.
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| 15 |
ID:
083901
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